China’s economic development plan in Xinjiang and how it affects ethnic instability by Wong-Tworek, Susan W.K.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2015-03
þÿ C h i n a  s   e c o n o m i c   d e v e l o p m e n t   p l a n   i n   X i n j i a n g   a n d
how it affects ethnic instability
Wong-Tworek, Susan W.K.













Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
CHINA’S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PLAN IN 









Thesis Advisor:  Tristan J. Mabry 
Co-Advisor: Robert E. Looney 
 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704–0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, 
searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send 
comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to 
Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 
22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington, DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 
 
2. REPORT DATE   
March 2015 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Master’s Thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE   
CHINA’S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PLAN IN XINJIANG AND HOW IT 
AFFECTS ETHNIC INSTABILITY 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
 
6. AUTHOR(S)  Susan W.K. Wong-Tworek 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  93943-5000 
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 
REPORT NUMBER     
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
10. SPONSORING/MONITORING 
    AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES  The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy 
or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. IRB Protocol number ____N/A____.  
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT   
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)  
 
To decrease ethnic instability in Xinjiang, the Chinese government’s plan is to economically develop the region. 
Xinjiang is rich in natural resources, is geographically significant and has a special economic zone. China is also 
investing in Central Asia to further meet its energy demand. A network of pipelines and major rail systems connect 
sources from China to Central Asia and beyond. Xinjiang’s economy will benefit from the network because it is the 
gateway and corridor to Central Asia and a hub for the Silk Road traffic. This study suggests that Xinjiang’s 
economic development led to a few destabilizing elements, including Han migration, income disparity and 
employment discrimination. All of this is taking place while the government is also dealing with other cultural issues, 
such as religion and education. The author hypothesizes that China’s economic development plan in the Xinjiang 
Uyghur (or Uighur) Autonomous Region increases, decreases or is a subsidiary factor to ethnic instability. This paper 











14. SUBJECT TERMS  
China, Xinjiang, Central Asia, Uyghurs, Turkic, Hans, Silk Road, Western Development, economic, 
disparity, discrimination, special economic zone, infrastructure, natural resources, religion, Islam, 
ethnic, conflict, violence, riot, instability, migration, peace, stability, education 
15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES  
92 

















NSN 7540–01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2–89)  
 Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239–18 
 i 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 ii 
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
 
 
CHINA’S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PLAN IN XINJIANG AND HOW IT 
AFFECTS ETHNIC INSTABILITY 
 
 
Susan W. K. Wong-Tworek 
Captain, United States Air Force 
B.A., Southern Illinois University Carbondale, 1998 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
 
 
MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY STUDIES 
























Mohammed M. Hafez 
Chair, Department of National Security Affairs 
 iii 




To decrease ethnic instability in Xinjiang, the Chinese government’s plan is to 
economically develop the region. Xinjiang is rich in natural resources, is geographically 
significant and has a special economic zone. China is also investing in Central Asia to 
further meet its energy demand. A network of pipelines and major rail systems connect 
sources from China to Central Asia and beyond. Xinjiang’s economy will benefit from 
the network because it is the gateway and corridor to Central Asia and a hub for the Silk 
Road traffic. This study suggests that Xinjiang’s economic development led to a few 
destabilizing elements, including Han migration, income disparity and employment 
discrimination. All of this is taking place while the government is also dealing with other 
cultural issues, such as religion and education. The author hypothesizes that China’s 
economic development plan in the Xinjiang Uyghur (or Uighur) Autonomous Region 
increases, decreases or is a subsidiary factor to ethnic instability. This paper argues that 
China’s economic development plan for Xinjiang affects ethnic stability in Xinjiang as a 
subsidiary factor.  
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The “Great Western Development” of 19991 was China’s strategy to boost the 
economy of Xinjiang and other provinces in western China.2 The campaign is one of the 
Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP, also known as Communist Party of China [CPC]) top 
economic development priorities to reduce poverty and decrease ethnic conflict between 
the Han Chinese and the Uyghurs.3 China is developing Xinjiang based on three 
factors—rich resources,4 the Silk Road5 and SEZ6 status. The Xinjiang Uyghur 
Autonomous Region (XUAR) has an abundance of rich resources that will help sustain 
and grow China’s economy.7 Xinjiang is also geographically located in the center of 
Asia, where the Silk Road crosses from different directions, bringing together traders and 
goods from China and Central and South Asia, the Middle East and Europe.8 To 
accommodate the traffic, China is developing Xinjiang into a cultural, financial, and 
logistical trade center.9 Because foreign trade has become an integral part of the XUAR’s 
economy over recent years, establishing stability through economic growth in that region 
1 Christopher Smith, “‘Flourishing Borders, Prosperous Nationalities,’ Campaign Expanded,” 
Congressional-Executive Commission on China, February 1, 2005, 
http://www.cecc.gov/publications/commission-analysis/flourishing-borders-prosperous-nationalities-
campaign-expanded. 
2 Elizabeth C. Economy and Michael Levi, By All Means Necessary, (Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 2014), 155. 
3 Elizabeth Van Wie Davis, “Uyghur Muslim Ethnic Separatism in Xinjiang, China,” Asia-Pacific 
Center for Security, January 2008,  http://www.apcss.org/college/publications/uyghur-muslim-ethnic-
separatism-in-xinjiang-china/. 
4 Nicolas Becquelin, “Staged Development in Xinjiang,” The China Quarterly, no. 178 (June 2004): 
XX, http://www.jstor.org/stable/20192338.  
5 Chien-peng Chung, “The Shanghai Co-operation Organization: China’s Changing Influence in 
Central Asia,” The China Quarterly 180 (December 2004): 1002, 
http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayFulltext?type=1&fid=275871&jid=CQY&volumeId=180&issu
eId=-1&aid=275870. 
6 “China’s Ambitions in Xinjiang and Central Asia: Part I,” Stratfor Analysis, September 2013, 
https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/chinas-ambitions-xinjiang-and-central-asia-part-
1?0=ip_login_no_cache%3D980c96aa102150f7c490c71e72ae41b6. 
7 Economy and Levi, By All Means Necessary, 155. 
8 “China’s Ambitions In Xinjiang and Central Asia, Part I.” 
9 “China Focus: New Road Exemplifies Xinjiang Prosperity, Stability Drive,” ChinaDaily.com.cn, 
July 5, 2014, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/n/2014/0705/c90882-8751420.html. 
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to attract business is crucial to Xinjiang’s economic success.10 To boost Xinjiang’s 
economic development, China designated Kashgar City in the southern Tarim Basin as a 
SEZ to attract foreign investments.11 
In addition to the XUAR, China has economic ties with Central Asia. Central 
Asia has more natural resources than Xinjiang, which could supply China with a constant 
flow of energy for decades.12 For the resources to reach China, the PRC and Central Asia 
have been collaborating on pipelines and rail systems construction projects to link the 
sources to the China Seas. Construction projects further link China, through land and sea, 
to states as far as Belgium.13 
XUAR is economically prospering, but instability continues to persist for a range 
of reasons, such as Uyghurs’ desire for autonomy or independence, dissatisfaction with 
the government, Han migration, income disparity, employment discrimination, religious 
suppression and resistance to assimilation.14 These factors can threaten the region and the 
state’s economy and security. Additionally, ethnic conflict may create economic 
roadblocks for the Chinese government in attaining its developmental goals such as 
China’s Silk Road Economic Belt project.15 The region may encounter additional 
difficulties attracting foreign and Chinese investors who feel threatened for lack of a 
secure investment in that region.16 
This thesis proposes three possible hypotheses: the PRC’s economic development 
plan for Xinjiang increases ethnic conflict, decreases ethnic conflict, or is a subsidiary 
10 Clifton W. Pannell and Philip Schmidt, “Structural Change and Regional Disparities in Xinjiang, 
China,” Eurasian Geography and Economics, 47, no. 3 (May 15, 2013), 347, 
http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rege20. 
11 “China’s Ambitions In Xinjiang and Central Asia, Part I.” 
12 Economy and Levi, By All Means Necessary, 148. 
13 “Why China is Creating a New ‘World Bank’ for Asia,” The Economist, November 11, 2014, 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2014/11/economist-explains-6. 
14 Davide Giglio, “Separatism and the War on Terror in China’s Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous 
Region,” Peace Operations Training Center, http://cdn.peaceopstraining.org/theses/giglio.pdf.  
15 Huhua Cao, “Urban-Rural Income Disparity and Urbanization: What is the Role of Spatial 
Distribution of Ethnic Groups?  A Case Study of Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region in Western China,” 
Routledge Taylor & Francis Group 44, no. 8 (October 2010): 972, 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00343400903401550#.VQyeXtJ4omw. 
16 Economy and Levi, By All Means Necessary, 20. 
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factor to ethnic conflict. One of the CCP’s top priorities is economic growth, with the 
hope that this facilitates ethnic stability between Uyghurs and Hans.17 Some scholars 
have proposed other important factors as well, including cultural and educational 
development, and ethnic policies to stabilize Xinjiang.18 This thesis will present in the 
literature review different scholarly perspectives of how China’s economic development 
plan in Xinjiang affects ethnic instability in the XUAR.19 
Chapter I of this thesis is the introduction, which introduces XUAR’s background 
and the literature review. Chapter II focuses on the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) 
economic development in the XUAR with the region’s rich resources, the Silk Road and 
SEZ. This chapter will also expand on China’s economic development with foreign 
states, especially with Central Asia’s resources and major infrastructure construction 
projects, which links China to Europe. Chapter III analyzes the economic factors that 
increase ethnic instability in Xinjiang. The chapter will also include other destabilizing 
factors such as religious suppression and the education system. Chapter IV is the final 
chapter. It will conclude with the findings for the hypothesis.   
A. BACKGROUND OF XINJIANG 
The next few segments of this chapter will focus on the XUAR’s demography, 
geography, resources, history, religion and conflict. Demography, geography and 
resources include many facts and figures. History, religion, and conflict, on the other 
hand, have dynamic timelines. 
17 Shan Wei and Weng Cuifen, “China’s New Policy in Xinjiang and its Challenges,” East Asian 
Policy 2, no. 3, 60, http://www.eai.nus.edu.sg/Vol2No3_ShanWei&WengCuifen.pdf. 
18 Arienne Dwyer, “The Xinjiang Conflict: Uyghur Identity, Language Policy, and Political 
Discourse,” East-West Center, 2005, 124.  http://www.eastwestcenter.org/fileadmin/stored/pdfs/PS015.pdf.  
19Aisen and Veiga, “How Does Political Instability Affect Economic Growth?” IMF Working Paper, 
January 2011, 9, https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2011/wp1112.pdf. 
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Figure 1.  Map of Xinjiang20 
1. Demography 
The XUAR of China, sometimes known as East Turkestan (ET), Uyghuristan and 
Chinese Turkestan,21 is home to approximately 21.6 million people of different 
ethnicities.22 Xinjiang borders eight countries (India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Tajikistan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Russia and Mongolia) and three Chinese provinces (Tibet 
Autonomous Region, Qinghai and Gansu).23 Its location gives Xinjiang a diverse 
population. In 2010, Xinjiang was comprised of 46.4 percent Uyghur, 39 percent Han, 
20 Pannell and Schmidt, “Structural Change and Regional Disparities in Xinjiang, China,” 331. 
21 “Who are the Uyghurs,” Radio Free Asia, July 9, 2009, 
http://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/uyghurs_facts-07092009163637.html. 
22 “Xinjiang,” The China Story, Australian Centre on China in the World, August 2, 2012, 
http://www.thechinastory.org/lexicon/xinjiang/. 
23 “Who are the Uyghurs.” 
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seven percent Kazakhs, 4.5 percent Hui, 0.9 percent Kirghiz, 0.8 percent Mongols, 0.2 
percent Tajik, 0.2 percent Sibe and the remaining Dagur, Manchu, Russian, Tatar, Uzbek 
and others.24 The absolute population of Uyghurs in Xinjiang has been consistently 
rising. It was 3.6 million in 1945, 13.1 million in 1982, 16.8 million in 1996, and 21.3 in 
2008.25 In 2000, statistics showed that 27.3 percent of the Uyghur population in Xinjiang 
are between 0–14 years of age; 68.17 percent are 15–64, and 4.53 are 65 and above.26 
Compared to China, in 2014, 17.1 percent of the people are between 0–14 years of age, 
73.2 percent are 15–64, and 9.6 percent are 65 and above.27 
2. Geography 
Xinjiang is the most northwestern and largest province in China. Its total land 
mass is 1,660,001 square kilometers (640,930 square miles).28 Approximately 41.2 
percent of the land in Xinjiang is suitable for agriculture, forestry, and raising animals.29 
Due to Xinjiang’s low and fluctuating precipitation, farmers rely on irrigation to water 
their crops. Although the climate is arid, the fertile land and long hours of sunlight are 
ideal for growing a variety of high quality produce such as potato, cotton, grapes and 
pomegranates.30  
24 Due to lack of access to more recent statistics, 2010 is the most recent figures I found in this site. 
The statistics of the population breakdown were cited from the 2010 Xinjiang Statistical Yearbook 
according to “Xinjiang,” The China Story, Australian Centre on China in the World, August 2, 2012, 
http://www.thechinastory.org/lexicon/xinjiang/.  
25 Anthony Howell and C. Cindy Fan, “Migration and Inequality in Xinjiang: A Survey of Hand and 
Uyghur Migrants in Urumqi,” Eurasian Geography and Economics 52, no. 1 (2011): 123, 
http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/geog/downloads/597/403.pdf.  
26 Peter Bernat, “The Uyghur Question and What is Behind It,” Institute for Strategic and Defence 
Studies Analyses (Budapest: Zrinyi Miklos National Defence University, 2009). 
http://www.academia.edu/5894876/The_Uyghur_Question_and_What_Is_Behind_It. 
27 “China Age Structure,” Index Mundi, access date February 8, 2015, 
http://www.indexmundi.com/china/age_structure.html. 
28 “Xinjiang Profile,” BBC News Asia, October 23, 2012, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-
pacific-16944155. 
29 “Xinjiang 2004-The Year in Review,” China.org.cn, accessed date January 20, 2015, 
http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/ProvinceView/156243.htm.  
30 Chengli, “Dawn of Modern Agriculture,” Tianshannet, January 11, 2008, 
http://english.ts.cn/topic/content/2008-01/11/content_2389645.htm.  
 5 
                                                 
While agriculture is significant in Xinjiang, XUAR is a vital province to the 
Chinese government for many reasons. The Silk Road goes through Xinjiang, making 
this region the land bridge to South and Central Asia, a hub for trade, and a corridor for 
transporting energy resources.31 Xinjiang’s natural geography forms a protective buffer 
with its deserts, mountains, plateaus and steppes, creating challenges for attacks from any 
directions.32 During the Sino-Soviet tension, XUAR was the barricade against the Union 
of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) threat. It also serves as a safety buffer between the 
Muslim Central and South Asian states and the rest of China.33 
3. Resources 
Xinjiang is rich in natural resources such as coal, oil, gas, gold, uranium and 
nonferrous metals. Beijing estimates one-third of China’s gas and oil reside in 
Xinjiang.34 Xinjiang’s oil has a history that dates back to the mid-seventeenth century 
during the Qing Dynasty. A river of crude oil was discovered in a mountain north-west of 
Kucha (or Qiuci). The native Kucheans used the smelly ooze as a rejuvenating remedy, 
while others used it for lamp-oil.35 A lot of oil seeped to the surface, but the main field 
that was opened and developed was in 1955 in Karamay.36 The city became synonymous 
with Xinjiang’s petrochemical refining center. New oil and natural gas fields are 
discovered frequently, which increases China’s energy reserve.37 In 2005, state-owned 
oil company Sinopec claimed to have discovered a field with more than one billion tons 
of crude oil, and a Tarim Basin field with 59 billion meters of natural gas.38 If the 
31 Gardner Bovingdon, The Uyghurs, Strangers in Their Own Land, ((New York, Columbia University 
Press, 2010), 11. 
32 Bovingdon, The Uyghurs, Strangers in Their Own Land, 11. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid. 
35 James A. Millward, Eurasian Crossroads, A History of Xinjiang (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2007), 300. 




                                                 
numbers are accurate and proven, that is an extra one third added onto China’s current 
reserve.39 
In addition, one hundred twenty-two minerals exist in the province but natron 
saltpeter, muscovite, beryllium, serpentine and pottery clay are the most abundant.40 
Over 70 different non-metallic minerals including asbestos, gemstones and jade also exist 
in Xinjiang.41 The province has an estimated 730 million tons of iron ore, 318 million 
tons of salt, 170 million tons of mirabilite and over 2 million tons of natron saltpeter.42  
4. History 
To illustrate the Uyghurs and the XUAR’s rich history, this section will start with 
an ethnic heritage that dates to pre-historic time. Then, the focus shifts to territorial 
disputes, starting from the Qing Dynasty in the 1700s until the fall of East Turkistan in 
1949. The final section transitions to the XUAR under Mao Zedong’s Communist rule.  
The history and origins of the Uyghur people differ from source to source. The 
World Uyghur Congress (WUC) states that Uyghurs were present 4,000 years ago;43 
historian Turgun Almas estimated the Uyghur population dates back 6,400 years ago 
based on the discoveries of Tarim basin mummies;44 Muhemmed Imin Bughra, a 
historian of East Turkistan and a Uyghur politician, believed Uyghurs existed for 9,000 
years.45 A majority of the literature refers to the Uyghur as a Turkic people who were 
39 Ibid. 




43 World Uyghur Congress is a pro-Uyghur Association. “Brief History of East Turkestan,” access 
date January 21, 2015,  http://www.uyghurcongress.org/en/?cat=132.  
44 Nabijan Tursun, “The Formation of Modern Uyghur Historiography and Competing Perspectives 





                                                 
native to the Central Asian basins of Junghar, Tarim, and Turpan.46 The Uyghur 
American Association declares that Uyghurs are Central Asian Turks, not Chinese.47 
According to another source, the Uyghurs are Persian, descendants of the ancient 
Sogdians.48 These were skilled traders who were known throughout Inner Asia as 
Iranian-speaking people.49 Starting in the sixth century common era (CE) and continuing 
for the next 15 centuries, Sogdians facilitated trade throughout the Silk Road, which runs 
through the Eurasian steppe, Central Asia and China.50 The primary goods they sold 
throughout this period were silk, silverware, musk and slaves.51 Physical Sogdian 
features are evident in modern day Uyghurs, especially along the heavily trod Silk 
Road.52 In the Uyghur bazaars of Kashgar, Khotan and Yarkhand, one will see people 
with exotic features from the west—hair with blond or brown color, and eyes with hazel 
and blue color.53  
According to some historians, the Uyghurs have been a nomadic Turkic people 
moving across the Mongolian Step in their early existence until they reached the modern 
area of Xinjiang.54 Because they were nomads, they identified with their territories and 
their oasis cities rather than an overarching single title, which would describe who they 
were collectively.55 
46 “Who are the Uyghurs.” 
47 About Uyghurs,” The Uyghur American Association, access date January 19, 2015, 
http://uyghuramerican.org/about-uyghurs. 
48 Ishaan Tharoor, “A Brief History of the Uighurs,” Time, July 9, 2009, 
http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1909416,00.html. 
49 Étienne de la Vaissière, “Sogdians in China: A Short History and some New Discoveries,” The 
SilkRoad Foundation Newsletter 1, no. 3 (December 2003), 
http://www.silkroadfoundation.org/newsletter/december/new_discoveries.htm.  




54 “A Brief History or the Uyghurs,” London Uyghur Ensemble, 2007, 
http://www.uyghurensemble.co.uk/en-html/uy-history1.html.  
55 Ibid.  
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In 1759, the Manchus of the Qing Empire in China invaded East Turkestan and 
ruled it until 1864.56 After 42 revolts, Uyghurs expelled the Manchus in 1864 and 
regained their independence.57 Yakub Beg became their leader, and henceforth, the 
independent kingdom was renamed Kasharia. Russia, Great Britain and the Turkish 
Empire recognized its independence. In 1876, the Manchu Empire invaded the region and 
annexed it in 1884. To prevent Russia’s tsarist expansion, Great Britain supported and 
funded the Qing Empire to conquer the area. After the Uyghurs’ defeat, Manchus 
renamed the East Turkestan to Xinjiang, the “New Territory.”58 In 1911, the Chinese 
Nationalist (Guomindang) Party overthrew the Qing dynasty.  
Shortly after, Uyghurs briefly achieved independence and established the Turkish 
Islamic Republic Eastern Turkistan (TIRET) from1933 to 1934 and the Eastern Turkistan 
Republic (ETR) from 1944 to 1949.59 From 1933 to 1934, the TIRET held the southern 
region of Xinjiang from Kashghar to the southern border.60 The ETR, with its Ili 
National Army (INA) gained independence from 1944–1949, and governed from Ghulja 
to the northwest.61 When the ETR fell apart due to insufficient manning to guard the 
territory, internal disagreements and external attacks, the CCP occupied Xinjiang from 
the ETR.  
The soldiers who fought in this war demobilized and worked on paramilitary 
farms subsequently known as the Production and Construction Corp (PCC).62 Eventually, 
Uyghurs, Kazakhs and other ethnic minorities accused PCC soldier-farmers of being 
“Han colonialists.” As a result, the CCP reinstated their effort to assimilate minorities.  
56 Ibid.  
57 Ibid.  
58 Ibid.  
59 Gardner Bovingdon, Autonomy in Xinjiang: Han Nationalist Imperatives and Uyghur Discontent 
(Washington, DC: East-West Center Washington, 2004), 18, 





                                                 
In October 1955, the XUAR was established.63 While the CCP’s autonomous 
region system was meant to give non-Hans control of their regions, in the government a 
Han majority ended up controlling Xinjiang. Uyghurs had little influence over their 
territorial affairs because the CCP controlled and crushed movements that hinted at 
promoting independence or “real autonomy.”64  
In the beginning of 1958, Mao’s “Great Leap Forward” program called for 
cultural homogenization, such that ethnic differences would be dissolved to create a 
unified people.65 The CCP attempted to force compliance through cultural isolation of 
Islamic customs seen by the party as outdated and ancient. By doing so, they hoped to aid 
progress. The outcome of Mao’s plan severely disrupted peoples’ livelihoods across 
China. Party leaders took control out of Mao’s hands in order to stabilize the economy. 
Though, the restructuring plan failed as well.66 Famine continued. As a result, an influx 
of 800,000 hungry people and party-backed Hans migrated into Xinjiang between 1959 
and 1960.67 The PCC farms welcomed the refugees with land, which incited Uyghur 
resentment toward the Han Chinese. 
By the mid-1960s, ethnic minority policies changed again. Renewed 
radicalization led to the “Cultural Revolution,” and a demand for extreme cultural 
homogeneity.68 Young Han Red Guards in Xinjiang battered non-Han culture.  For 
example, policies instructed various minorities to wear Mao suits instead of their 
traditional hats, scarves, accessories and clothes. Red Guards forced Muslims to raise 
pigs, shaved Muslims’ beards on the street and destroyed mosques as a way to forcibly 
promote the new age of China; progress and rapid assimilation.  
After more than a decade of ethnic minority resentment, Mao’s death on 
September 9, 1976 and the arrest of the Gang of Four brought on a new challenge for 
63 Bovingdon, Autonomy in Xinjiang, 13.  
64 Ibid., 14. 
65 Ibid., 19. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Ibid., 20. 
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party leaders.69 Segments of alienated populations throughout the PRC felt the Cultural 
Revolution was a political, social and identity assault.70 
5. Religion 
For the Uyghurs, Islam is more than a belief—it is an identity intertwined into 
their lives, culture, economy, society and political system.71 A majority of the Uyghurs in 
Xinjiang are Sunni Muslims.72  
From a time before the Cultural Revolution to the present day, the Uyghurs have 
experienced different levels of state tolerance of religion. This section focuses on the 
pendulum swing of soft and hard policies under Mao’s regime, Deng Xiaoping’s 
administration, and into the aftermath of the United States’ September 11, 2001 attack. 
In 1966, religion in Xinjiang was loosely controlled. Kashgar District had 
approximately 5,500 mosques, and 107 of them existed in the city of Kashgar. During 
this time, the CCP had little tolerance for religion. In the 1970s, Mao and his Red Guards 
purged tradition, relics, history, antique, and religious establishments. Kashgar District 
was left with 392 mosques and Kashgar City with two. After Mao’s death in 1976, Deng 
loosened cultural policies, which allowed religion to rebuild again. Between 1980 and 
1981, Muslims reclaimed and rebuilt mosques until Kashgar District reached 4,700 




69 Bovingdon, Autonomy in Xinjiang, 21. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Justin Jon Rudelson, Oasis Identities: Uyghur Nationalism along China’s Silk Road (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1997), 45, 
http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=MT2D_0_eBPQC&pg=PA47&lpg=PA47#v=onepage&q&f=false.  
72 Rudelson, Oasis Identities, 22.  
73 Bovingdon, The Uyghurs, Strangers in Their Own Land, 66. 
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On December 4, 1982, the CCP established the Constitution of the People’s 
Republic of China, and within it, have an article about religious freedom: 
No state organ, public organization or individual may compel citizens to 
believe in, or not believe in, any religion; nor may they discriminate 
against citizens who believe in, or do not believe in, any religion. The state 
protects normal religious activities. No one may make use of religion to 
engage in activities that disrupt public order, impair the health of citizens 
or interfere with the educational system of the state. Religious bodies and 
religious affairs are not subject to any foreign domination.74 
While Article 36 provides citizens with freedom of religion, there are 
stipulations.75 For example, children at any age can profess to be an atheist, but must be 
18 to proclaim a religious faith. Furthermore, the article prohibits foreign domination 
over religion, religious rituals that impair citizens’ health and activities that cause public 
disorder.76 
In 1990, shortly before the Soviet Union’s collapse, a violent uprising in the city 
of Baren surprised Chinese officials.77 Muslim activists proclaimed that Islam would 
defeat Marxism-Leninism.78 The uprising and the fall of the Soviet Union led the CCP to 
overturn its liberal policy to limited religious tolerance. According to Gardner 
Bovingdon, “officials prosecuted ‘illegal religious activities,’ defrocking suspect clerics, 
breaking up unauthorized scripture schools, and halting the construction of mosques.”79 
The government implemented new policies. For example, imams have to go through a 
political examination. Only those who are deemed patriotic and politically sound can 
remain in their position. The CCP also established a religious institution in Urumqi that 
new clerics must train in. The party took other measures including the destruction of 
seventy mosques or religious sites in Ili Prefecture, and twenty-one sites in Urumqi, the 
74 “The Constitution of the People’s Republic of China,” U.S. Constitution, accesse March 2, 2015, 
http://www.usconstitution.net/china.html. 
75 Kevin Newton, “Requirements of Religion in Xinjiang,” Monitor, 2011, 43, 
http://web.wm.edu/so/monitor/issues/16-SE/5-newton.pdf.  
76 Newton, “Requirements of Religion in Xinjiang,” 43.  




                                                 
shutdown of underground schools, the exclusion of religion from education and the 
banning of students from fasting during Ramadan.80  
The aftermath of the United States’ September 11, 2001 attacks further intensified 
the Chinese government’s stance against alleged separatists and terrorists, especially 
when the Muslim population is involved. Along with China, other states such as 
Chechnya, Karabakh, Kashmir, Palestine and the Philippines associate separatist 
movements with terrorism.81 The Chinese government heightened its “Strike Hard, 
Maximum Pressure”82 campaign to suppress secular and religious conflict. In November 
2001, in Kashgar, authorities closed thirteen illegal religious centers and arrested the fifty 
people who prayed in the facilities.83 Restrictions continued to increase. For example, the 
loyalty requirement that used to apply only to clerics, now apply to all Muslims.84  
The CCP’s soft and hard policies in Xinjiang swung back and forth for the last 
few decades from fierce punishments to accommodating the Uyghurs’ religious practices. 
However, based on the past few years’ record of ethnic conflicts, China responded with 
tougher restrictions and control.85 
6. Conflict 
From 1949–2005, the XUAR has been plagued with protests and violent events 
between Uyghurs and Han Chinese. This section will provide glimpses of events that 
took place between 1949 and 1980, which will help contextualize contemporary conflicts 
inside and outside of Xinjiang.  
 
80 Bovingdon, The Uyghurs, Strangers in Their Own Land, 67–71. 
81 Graham E. Fuller and S. Frederick Starr, The Xinjiang Problem (The John Hopkins University, 
Central Asia-Caucasus Institute), 14.  
82 Ibid., 32. 
83 Bovingdon, The Uyghurs, Strangers in Their Own Land, 71. 
84 Ibid., 72. 
85 Fuller and Starr, The Xinjiang Problem , 35. 
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After the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) “peaceful liberation”86 of the XUAR 
in 1949, armed uprisings and rebellions spreaded throughout the region. In 1950, Uyghur 
resistance leaders such as Khalibek organized one attack, while other leaders such as 
Abaydulla, Sultan Sarif, Janabil and Orazbay organized five rebellions against the PLA. 
The PLA quickly suppressed the rebellions.87 In 1951, Uyghurs continued their quest for 
independence through armed struggles. The PLA, again, put down the rebellions. In 
1952, religious rhetoric started interweaving into resistance efforts. Pan-Turkists 
allegedly established the “Islamic Alliance Party” to plot an armed uprising against the 
government, while other Uyghur resistance leaders established and led a “religious army” 
to rise against the CCP.88  
Activities in the years between 1953 and 1957 tapered off. In 1953, no protests or 
violence took place.89 From 1954 to 1957, one to two Uyghur uprisings or insurgencies 
sprouted per year; and the government reacted by taking the participants prisoner.  
In 1962, due to the hardship following the Great Leap Forward, a mass emigration 
of 62,000 Uyghurs and Kazakhs fled to Kazakhstan to escape famine.90 From 1962 to 
1966, according to Bovingdon, no protests or violent events took place between Uyghurs 
and Han Chinese. As for 1966 until 1979, previous sections already covered the struggles 
between Uyghurs and Han Chinese.91 Based on Bovingdon’s accounts, protests and 
violent events before 1975 were instigated by Uyghurs mainly to rebel against the 
government for ‘colonizing’ Xinjiang.92  
In 1975, the trend of protest and violence changed. Han migrants in Xinjiang 
started protests and violent acts against Beijing for economic reasons.93 Over 100,000 
86 Bovingdon, Autonomy in Xinjiang, 18.  
87 Bovingdon, The Uyghurs, Strangers in Their Own Land, 174. 
88 Ibid., 175. 
89 Ibid., 175–6. 
90 Bovingdon, The Uyghurs, Strangers in Their Own Land, 176. 
91 Refer to the history and religion sections in the Introduction. 
92 Bovingdon, The Uyghurs, Strangers in Their Own Land, 177. 
93 Ibid. 
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protesters were young migrants sent by Beijing to settle along the USSR-Xinjiang 
borders in the 1960s. They were recruited to strengthen defense against the Russians from 
enticing Muslim Uyghurs into the Soviet Union. Many of the youths were recent junior 
and senior high school graduates from Shanghai who would have been unemployed had 
they stayed in the city.94 In 1979, these Shanghai youths petitioned twice to return home. 
Beijing denied their requests. In 1980, the youths proceeded to demonstrate.95 From this 
point on, the combination of Han and Uyghur dissatisfaction with the government, and 
each other, continued to escalate. Tension rose between Uyghurs and Han Chinese for 
political, cultural and economic reasons. For events between 1980 and 2005, refer to the 
appendix. 
B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
There are many books published about China’s grand economic development. 
However, books written about the XUAR and its economic growth in relation to ethnic 
instability are limited. Authors often focus on the region’s violence, battle for greater 
autonomy, and cultural and religious freedom. Nonetheless, many writers have also 
published theses, articles in scholarly journals, daily news and blogs pertaining to 
economy and instability, which will become my main sources of reference for this thesis. 
Timothy Beardson pointed out in his book Stumbling Giant that ethnic instability 
in China threatens the PRC’s economic growth.96 Beardson wrote a section about 
Xinjiang, indicating that the CCP’s acknowledgment of the Uyghurs’ discontent is 
primarily due friction associated with language, religion and economic challenges.97  
Ari Aisen and Francisco Jose Veiga agree with Beardson that political instability 
affects economic growth. The authors used data models that spanned 44 years and 
approximately 170 countries to prove the association through the use of data and the 
empirical model. Their hypothesis is that political instability can result in lower economic 
94 Topping, “Shanghai Youths Sent to Sinkiang.” 
95 Ibid. 
96 Timothy Beardson, Stumbling Giant, the Threats to China’s Future (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 2013), 6. 
97 Beardson, Stumbling Giant, 223. 
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growth, affecting the rate of GDP per capita.98 The authors also indicated that low 
economic growth can lead to increased government instability.99 On the other hand, a 
free economy with a homogeneous population seems to have a positive effect on 
growth,100 yet surprisingly they found that democracy had a slightly unfavorable effect 
on economic growth.101 Although their research was at the international level, the 
empirical data is applicable to Xinjiang’s regional level as well. The authors’ research 
contributed valuable data by identifying the effects of political instability to economic 
performance.102  
While Beardson, Aisen, and Veiga believe instability affects economic growth, 
Clifton W. Pannell and Philipp Schmidt have a different opinion.103 They believe 
violence in Xinjiang is independent of its economic growth. The Chinese government is 
moving Xinjiang’s development full speed ahead despite continued ethnic, social, and 
political instability. This move is not necessarily the solution to stability in Xinjiang. 
Pannell and Schmidt substantiated regional economic disparities in Xinjiang through 
models, and official statistical data.104   
In addition to economic growth, Pannell, Schmidt and Davide Giglio agree that 
violence between Han Chinese and Turkic Uyghurs had been related to disparity in 
employment due to ethnicity.105 Because economic development is often perceived to 
benefit the Han-Chinese more than the Uyghurs, the employment inequalities lead to 
violence between the two ethnicities. Their data revealed obvious advantages for the Han. 
Even though Uyghurs are the majority ethnic group in Xinjiang, Han Chinese dominate 
the higher echelons, and attain higher living standards and occupy higher political and 
98 Aisen and Veiga, “How Does Political Instability Affect Economic Growth?,” 1. 
99 Ibid., 9. 
100 Ibid., 11. 
101 Ibid., 1. 
102 Ibid., 25. 
103 Aisen and Veiga, “How Does Political Instability Affect Economic Growth?,” 9. 
104 Pannell and Schmidt, “Structural Change and Regional Disparities in Xinjiang, China,” 349. 
105 Giglio, “Separatism and the War.”  
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economic management positions.106 Gardner Bovingdon identified the employment 
disparity in Xinjiang’s state-run mining and export of oil and gas.107 Beijing controlled 
the labor force, which resulted in almost 100 percent Han Chinese.108 But are disparities 
the root causes of violence? Giglio argues that poverty and backwardness are the root 
causes of Uyghur violence.109  
Aside from employment disparity, Tyler Harlan compared the Han and Uyghurs 
in different sectors. He argued that self-employment and private enterprise are mainly 
concentrated in urban areas of northern Xinjiang. Xinjiang’s private sector is important to 
its economy, yet Uyghur participation in the private sector is low compared to the Han. 
Uyghur entrepreneurs dominate the informal or unregistered private sector especially in 
trade and catering services.110  
Anthony Howell and C. Cindy Fan’s research focused on a different aspect: 
internal migration, specifically on Han-minority inequality. The authors substantiated 
their research by using 30 of Urumqi’s service activities, and roughly 600 participants. 
Their research reported that recent Han migrants from other provinces migrated to 
Xinjiang on their own instead of being sponsored by the state. They are less educated and 
less skilled. They chose to migrate to Xinjiang because competition is less compared to 
the east coast. On the other hand, Uyghur migrants to Urumqi are generally young, highly 
educated, from the southern region, hired into the service and professional fields, and 
often earn higher salary than Han migrants.111 The authors concluded that in this 
particular study, Hans were not exempted from disparities, and that Uyghurs were not 
discriminated from higher paying jobs.  
106 Pannell and Schmidt, “Structural Change and Regional Disparities.” 
107 Bovingdon, Autonomy in Xinjiang, viii. 
108 Ibid. 
109 Giglio, “Separatism and the War on Terror.” 
110 Tyler Harlan, “Private Sector Development in Xinjiang, China:  A Comparison between Uyghur 
and Han,” Espace Population Societes, March 2009, 407–8, http://eps.revues.org/3772.  
111 Howell and Fan, “Migration and Inequality in Xinjiang,” 199 and 136.  
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Scholars have varying opinions about economic development and its effects on 
stability. Giglio expressed his concurrence that long-term economic development policy 
is a necessary solution to an ethnically stable Xinjiang that is free of fanatic Islamist 
violence. An important aspect Giglio argued for is that development must be in 
conjunction with improvements and opportunities, which have to be more evenly spread 
among Uyghurs to reduce poverty.112 Xinjiang is rich in resources yet the region is still 
in need of state funds to assist the Uyghurs in the private sector. Thus, Harlan and 
Webber advocate for government support to fuel corporate Uyghur entrepreneurship, 
taking the Uyghurs from the informal to formal economic market. Government support is 
crucial to encourage Uyghurs into businesses, boost the region’s economic growth, and 
enhance ethnic stability.113 Nevertheless, Giglio praised Xinjiang for overcoming 
economic and cultural backwardness quite remarkably.114 
Altay Atli, a lecturer in Boğaziçi University in Istanbul, Turkey, argued that 
China depends on Xinjiang for its continuous economic growth. To substantiate his 
argument, he compared Xinjiang’s contribution to the nation, to other eastern provinces. 
According to his study, China is dependent on a stable Xinjiang for political and 
economic security.115 As Xinjiang’s local and regional economy develops, Atli believes 
the XUAR transportation infrastructure, contacts and trades with its neighboring states 
will continue to improve and expand.116 
In order to hypothesize whether China’s Economic Development Program in 
Xinjiang is increasing interethnic conflict or not, it is necessary to research other causes 
of instability. Bovingdon argues that unrest in Xinjiang usually has multiple causes. To 
support his argument, he analyzed historical policy changes, and studied current policies 
112 Giglio, “Separatism and the War on Terror.” 
113 Tyler Harlan and Michael Webber, “New Corporate Uyghur Entrepreneurs in Urumqi, China,” 
Central Asian Survey 31, no.2 (May 8, 2012): 176, 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02634937.2012.671993#.VBmt2ZRdWrY.  
114 Giglio, “Separatism and the War on Terror.” 
115 Altay Atli, “The Role of Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region in the Economic Security of 
China.”  OAKA, Journal of Central Asian & Caucasian Studies, 2011, 123. 
116 “China Focus: New Road Exemplifies Xinjiang Prosperity, Stability Drive.” 
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in Xinjiang. Though this literature was published in 2004, his arguments are still 
important and valid for understanding the basis of Uyghurs’ unrest.117 He used a 
sequence of events from 1950 when China had relative tolerance, to 1990 when Deng 
Xiaoping squashed a violent uprising in Xinjiang. Without economic development, will 
Xinjiang’s ethnic conflicts persist? If Xinjiang’s economic growth stops, will autonomy 
be enough to stabilize Xinjiang? As it stands for the time being, deep discontent has been 
brewing due to Beijing forbidding XUAR to openly express their frustration and 
dissatisfaction with their rights in the region.118  
Giglio believes the root cause of Xinjiang’s unrest is culture and religion. He 
believes Uyghurs are interpreting and fearing the CPC’s cultural and religious restrictions 
in assembly, language, and religion as a way to assimilate the Uyghurs, whether that is 
the CPC’s intention or not.119 He reports that past unrest was motivated more by non-
religious demands than Islamic ideology. However, religion is becoming the Uyghurs’ 
method of expressing their growing economic grievances. Beijing’s concern is the 
radicalization of Uyghurs if they become influenced by foreign Islamic militants. 
Normally, Beijing’s task is to strike a balance between containment of the separatist 
movements and genuine autonomy.120  
At this moment, the balance may be many years away. The government seems to 
be putting efforts into containment but not so much with entrusting Xinjiang with 
autonomy. For example, Xinhua reported in May 2014, that in front of Kucha County’s 
government building, a group of people protested for the arrest of one hundred women 
and middle school girls for wearing head scarves, which is a dress code violation. The 
protest turned violent when participants hurled stones at the building and beat the school 
117 Bovingdon, Autonomy in Xinjiang, vii. 
118 Ibid., viii. 
119 Giglio, “Separatism and the War on Terror.” 
120 Ibid. 
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principal and a township official. As a result of the violent turn of events, policemen fired 
into the crowd trying to disperse them, killing at least two protesters.121  
Ching Mun Rosalyn Lim argues that ethnic and religious differences are not 
enough to cause armed conflict. Contentions are generally complex and multi-layered. 
Religion is important to the Uyghurs, but to stereotype their conflicts with Islam can 
inherently exclude important contexts related to social relations, history and politics.122 
Therefore, both Lim and Giglio argue along the same lines that Uyghur violence is more 
often motivated by secular demands, and less by Islamic fundamentalism.123  
Lim suggests a re-evaluation of the region’s current policies to change from 
reinforcement of the Uyghur’s distinction from the Han’s, to the accommodation of the 
Uyghur’s transition and inclusion into Chinese society. To stop and prevent further 
damage to inter-ethnic ties, the CPC should develop a reasonable and comprehensive 
approach to manage ethnic minorities.124 According to Yan Sun, China President Xi 
Jinping is aware of the dilemmas in Xinjiang and is striving to make improvements to the 
region. He will support the protection of legitimate religion, but at the same time, abolish 
illicit religious practices.125  
Arienne Dwyer concedes that the underlying animosities and conflict between the 
government and the Uyghurs will persist unless cultural and religious issues are 
addressed.126 Nonetheless, her study focused on another important topic: language and 
ethnic identity. Dwyer insists that official language policies can be a catalyst for conflict 
over ethnic nationalism. For major ethnic groups, the resolution to ethnic conflict has to 
121 Shohret Hoshur, “Over 100 Detained after Xinjiang Policy Open Fire on Protesters,” Radio Free 
Asia, May 23, 2014, http://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/detained-05232014165418.html.  
122 Ching Mun Rosalyn Lim, “Religion, Ethnicity, and Economic Marginalization as Drivers of 
Conflict in Xinjiang,” Georgetown University, November 29, 2011, iii.  
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.pdf?sequence=1.  
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World Affairs 113, no. 764 (September 2014): 237,  
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include linguistic and cultural autonomy. Contrary to the CPC’s policy, Dwyer argues for 
Beijing to support and maintain Uyghurs’ unique language and identity—it will benefit 
China’s goal in nation building. And, because Uyghurs are pro-Americans, Washington 
should clearly state to Beijing that the United States wants to cooperate with them—and 
the Uyghurs—on human rights, including cultural rights.127  
James Leibold argues that the current ethnic policy is a failure. CPC officials’ are 
open to new approaches to reduce ethnic conflict and establish social stability, which is a 
prequisite for regime stability in Xinjiang. Reformers believe China could take small, yet 
vital, consensus building steps to slowly decrease ethnic violence and separatist activities. 
In the meantime, to monitor ethnic violence, the government is using high-tech 
surveillance to increase security efforts in troubled areas.128  
Leibold continued to emphasize that if policy reform is the key to overcome 
regional instability, then the government has to make it a top-priority. CPC policymakers, 
Chinese scholars, and public leaders acknowledge the necessity of ethnic-policy reform 
to strengthen interethnic cohesion and national integration. However, ethnic policy 
reform is relatively low on the CPC’s priority list.129 Beardson pointed out that Beijing 
has the ability to change Xinjiang’s future by involving the Uyghurs in the debate. 
Instead, Uyghurs have been excluded from participation. By restricting Uyghurs to 
peacefully oppose political issues in an open forum, the CPC only encourages violent 
opposition.130  
Nevertheless, when Uyghurs have the opportunity to debate, Leibold suggests for 
the Uyghurs to make clear to Beijing the root of the issues they are unhappy and 
dissatisfied with. Otherwise, the ethnic policy changes Beijing makes will be a wasted 
effort. All in all, Beijing will continue to uphold economic development and make it a top 
priority, even though some leaders do not believe money alone will solve Xinjiang’s 
127 Arienne Dwyer, “The Xinjiang Conflict: Uyghur Identity, Language Policy, and Political 
Discourse,” East-West Center, 2005, 124.  http://www.eastwestcenter.org/fileadmin/stored/pdfs/PS015.pdf.  
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ethnic and religious issues. The author pointed out that Ma Rong of Peking University 
and other scholars believe if long-term changes occur in China’s ethnic policy, the 
progression will be nonlinear and long-drawn-out. Nonetheless, the effort should 
strengthen interethnic cohesiveness and national integration.131  
Despite ethnic instability, Giglio suggested that Xinjiang’s living standards have 
progressed with each year: life expectancy has been extended, the income gap between 
social classes has shrunk, food consumption has grown, quality of life has improved and 
the rate of death has decreased.132 
Although seldom discussed, Giglio acknowledged that some Uyghurs embraced 
and adapted to the Han’s socio-economic change, and understood the necessity of 
progress. Lim pointed out that Uyghurs who have assimilated have better protection and 
enjoy greater autonomy. Notwithstanding, Uyghurs who are satisfied with the status quo 
experience prejudice from Han migrants and Uyghur separatist.133  
131 Leibold, “Ethnic Policy in China.” 
132 Giglio, “Separatism and the War on Terror.” 
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II.  CHINA’S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PLAN IN THE 
XUAR 
During the early 1980s, Deng Xiaoping developed an economic plan to improve 
China’s economy. The development plan was to start in the eastern coastal regions and 
then proceeded toward the west. As the east grow, so did the income gap between the east 
and the west. Beijing reacted in June 1999, by forming a group, led by Premier Shu 
Rongji with 17 ministerial-level officials to oversee the development of the western 
regions.134  
Chinese leadership understood that a lesser developed western region such as 
Xinjiang would affect the PRC’s prosperity and political stability, attract Islamic 
extremism, and encourage ethnic separatism.135 After the July 5, 2009, riot, China 
President Hu Jintao spoke in Xinjiang saying that “the fundamental way to resolve the 
Xinjiang problem is to expedite development in Xinjiang.”136 To assist with the XUAR 
development, 19 wealthy provinces and cities paired with different Xinjiang cities to 
provide funds, technology, human resources and management support. Shanghai, for 
example, paired with counties in Kashgar Prefecture such as Bachu, Shache, Yechang 
and Zepu.137 
President Xi emphasized the salience of economic growth during the 2014 
Chinese New Year message, “Our ultimate goal in pushing forward [with economic 
development] is to make the nation more prosperous and strong.”138 In order to have a 
prosperous and strong China, he argued Beijing has to develop Xinjiang into an 
economically sound and ethnically stable region.  
134 Davis, “Uyghur Muslim Ethnic Separatism in Xinjiang, China.” 
135 Atli, “The Role of Xinjiang,” 120. 
136 Wei and Cuifen, “China’s New Policy in Xinjiang,” 60. 
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The XUAR’s economic growth and stability depends heavily on its rich natural 
resources with oil and mineral bringing in the greatest wealth. In the process of exploiting 
the region’s natural resources, the PRC also has plans to revive the Silk Road, which runs 
through the XUAR. With Xinjiang as a crossroad, China plans to develop the region into 
a financial, trade, education, science and cultural hub. To attract investors to the southern 
Tarim Basin, which is poorer than the northern Dzungarian Basin, China designated 
Kashgar a SEZ in 2010 to attract investors.139 SEZs have unique policies and flexible 
policies to encourage economic growth. 
China’s economic development in the west goes beyond Xinjiang’s border. The 
PRC expanded economic relationship with the Central Asian republics including 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, to meet its energy 
demand and lessen its reliance on sea-lanes in the South and East China Seas.140 China is 
tapping into Central Asia’s resources, and major pipelines and rail system construction 
projects have already linked Central Asian states to China.  
A. RESOURCES 
China’s economic development in the XUAR is mainly in energy. Investment in 
mining and energy sectors spiked 33 percent for both 2011 and 2012. From January to 
September 2012, the fixed-asset investment in the XUAR was $66 billion.141 
Furthermore, one of the world’s largest untapped thermal coal reserves resides in the 
XUAR. In 2012, the coal output was 141 million metric tons. The forecast is that by 
2020, its output will be approximately 750 million metric tons. On July 30, 2013, Sinopec 
Group, or China Petrochemical Corporation, was one of 35 companies that submitted a 
bid to lead a $32 billion project to create synthetic natural gas. Moreover, the government 
has a plan to extend the XUAR’s operation to becoming the center to process and store 
oil, gas, coal, chemical, and wind power generation.142  
139 “China’s Ambitions In Xinjiang and Central Asia, Part I.” 
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In the past, the region’s economic development, infrastructure and workforce 
faced a lot of constraints, which limited its growth. Up until recently, Xinjiang did not 
have the resources, technology and manpower to capitalize on the region’s mineral and 
petroleum deposits. To catch up to the national average GDP, the government’s 10th Five 
Year Development Plan implemented the “Western Development” plan (xibu dakaifa), 
from 2001 to 2005, to quicken central and western regions’ development and to equalize 
the economic growth between regions. The government’s investment into the region 
encouraged Chinese people from the east to “Go West,” to gain prosperity.143 At the 
same time, the increase of migrants increased the workforce, boosted the number of 
skilled tradesmen, transformed regional innovation, advanced urbanization, established 
sustainable agricultural practices and developed a sound electrical distribution system to 
provide green power to the modernization effort.144 The plan raised the XUAR’s 
economic strength, despite the contention between the Ugyhurs and Hans over economic 
dynamics. With the influx of migrants and skills, the region’s GDP within the last 10 
years experienced periods above the national GDP.145 Based on Peter Bernat’s study, 
there was a time frame in the 2000s when the XUAR GDP increased from an annual 150 
billion to 220 billion yuan.146  
The CCP has been strengthening the XUAR’s infrastructure and economic 
robustness. Large scale infrastructure has been in construction, especially pipelines and 
railways to transport resources and provide access to Central-Asia’s even larger natural 
resources fields. For example, to accommodate the east coast’s energy demand and to 
boost Xinjiang’s economy, China announced in Spring 2000, the national “Develop the 
West” program to develop a 12–20 bcm/year (billion cubic meters per year) pipeline that 
links the west to the demand centers of eastern China. In June 2001, PetroChina and 
143 Howell and Fan, “Migration and Inequality in Xinjiang,” 121.  
144 “China: Xinjiang Province,” The World Bank Saber Country Report, 2014, 
http://wbgfiles.worldbank.org/documents/hdn/ed/saber/supporting_doc/CountryReports/WFD/SABER_Wf
D_China_Xinjiang_CR_Final_2014.pdf. 
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consortia partnered to develop the Tarim Basin gas fields and construct the “West-to-
East” pas pipeline. Exxon-Mobil, Gazprom, Shell, China Light and Power, Hong Kong 
and China Gas, and Stroytransgas agreed to make its first oil and gas deliveries through 
the 4,200 pipeline to Shanghai in 2004.147 In 2004, the pipeline promptly transported 29 
billion cubic meters of gas to the eastern region.148 Another ongoing project is the $196 
billion power generation expansion and ultra-high voltage transmission lines connecting 
the XUAR coalfields to consumers in the east. In addition, the government also has plans 
for a $392 billion rail network expansion for high-speed rail and national freight 
transports to encourage.149  
B. INVESTING FOR FUTURE GROWTH: SILK ROAD 
Aside from developing the XUAR with its rich resources, Beijing is also reviving 
the historic Silk Road. The Silk Road has a salient role in the XUAR and vice versa. 
China is planning, and in some cases, already, modernizing transcontinental highways, 
railroads, and telecommunications lines. The enhancements will boost the infrastructure 
and industrial and financial cooperation with the emerging markets that reside along the 
route.150  
The Silk Road is vital to the XUAR because it is the hub for visitors from South 
and Central Asia, the Middle East, and Europe as they enter China. Historically, nomads, 
diplomats, pilgrims, soldiers, generals, monks, traders and investors traversed the route, 
with Marco Polo and Kublai Khan leaving their famous footprints. The international Silk 
Road trade route was not an actual fixed road. A better way to describe it is that it a 
network that traders used to exchange a plethora of consumer goods: silk, coins, paper, 
147 Philip Andrews-Speed, Energy Policy and Regulation in the People’s Republic of China (Hague, 
Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, 2004), 
http://www.kluwerlaw.com/Catalogue/titleinfo.htm?ProdID=9041122338.  
148 Bernat, “The Uyghur Question and What is Behind It.” 
149  “China’s Ambitions in Xinjiang and Central Asia: Part 2,” Stratfor Global Intelligence, October 1, 
2013, https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/chinas-ambitions-xinjiang-and-central-asia-part-
2?0=ip_login_no_cache%3D64588ce110c2f8281f2251b62a9a41df. 
150 Mandy Zuo, “China Pushes for Revival of Silk Road to Boost Trading Links with Neighbours,” 
South China Morning Post, February 17, 2015, http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1657213/road-
chinas-past-future.  
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spices, art, utensils and even ideas.151 The Silk Road may function similarly in 
contemporary time except in greater capacity and speed.  
The XUAR is important to China’s rejuvenation of the Silk Road because it is 
China’s gateway to the west and the crossroad for Russia, Kazakhstan, and China.152 In 
late 2013, Beijing proposed the “Belt and Road” project. President Xi called to its 
neighbors to accelerate the linking of infrastructures and cooperation in construction.153 
Beijing’s strategy to extend the Silk Road from China through Central and Western Asia 
to Europe is known as the Silk Road Economic “Belt” project. This economic trunk line 
may affect more than 40 Asian and European countries and possibly three billion 
people.154 On October 24, 2014, China and 21 Asian states established the Asian 
Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) to finance the building of regional connectivity, 
such as roads and cell phone towers, and infrastructure of the Belt-and-Road.155 As of 
January 2015, AIIB’s member count increased to 26, including Bangladesh, Brunei, 
Cambodia, China, India, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Laos, Malaysia, Maldives, Mongolia, 
Myanmar, New Zealand, Nepal, Oman, Pakistan, the Philippines, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, 
Singapore, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Thailand, Uzbekistan and Vietnam. In February 2015, 
Chinese leaders presented the priorities for initiatives, emphasizing the transport 
infrastructure, financial collaboration, trade and investment expedition, and cultural 
interactions.156  
Improved network and infrastructure on the Silk Road could mutually benefit 
China and other users, enhancing economic interaction, integration and cooperation. To 
accommodate Xinjiang’s foreseeable growth, CCP tasked the region to reform its 
financial, logistical, and trade centers. The southern region will become a major traffic 
151 JunJie Ma, “The New Silk Road and the Power of Ideas,” The Diplomat, February 10, 2015, 
http://thediplomat.com/2015/02/the-new-silk-road-and-the-power-of-ideas/.  
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hub. Its transportation network will spread in all directions, connecting China to Europe; 
and West, South and Central Asia.157 In addition to the Silk Road bringing in economic 
prosperity, President Xi also claims it will bring peace, security and stability to China.158  
C. SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONE 
The economy in southern Xinjiang, comparatively, has not performed as well as 
northern Xinjiang. To give the southern region an economic boost, Beijing designated 
Kashgar as a Special Economic Zone (SEZ) in May 2010.159 As Kashgar is a SEZ, 
investors may benefit from preferential policies in finance, taxation, industries, trade and 
land use. Using Shenzhen as an example, the Chinese government plans to develop 
Kashgar into a booming economic hub.160  
The SEZ reform was Deng Xiaoping’s plan to enhance the PRC’s economic 
growth. He saw the open market as the future to China’s prosperity. At the start, Deng 
mainly identified coastal cities and provinces such as Guangzhou, Shanghai, and 
Shenzhen as the targets to “receive foreign investment, establish joint ventures, and 
export.” Eventually, SEZ allowed overseas companies to invest.161 The SEZ plan 
succeeded. At the state level, China’s economy experienced double digit growth for more 
than 25 years.162 At the city level, Shenzhen, a rural fishing village outside of Hong 
Kong, became an SEZ. Between 1980 and 2004, Shenzhen’s GDP averaged 28 percent 
growth per year and in 2004, per capital GDP was $7,161, which was the highest of any 
mainland China city.163  
157 “China Focus:  New Road Exemplifies Xinjiang Prosperity, Stability Drive.” 
158 Xinhua, “China to Share Development with Countries along Maritime Silk Road,” 
ChinaDaily.com.cn, February 13, 2015, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2015-
02/13/content_19580300.htm.  
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160 Wei and Cuifen, “China’s New Policy in Xinjiang,” 64. 
161 Economy and Levi, By All Means Necessary, 20. 
162 Ibid. 
163 “Facts and Figures,” North American Representative Office of Shenzhen, P.R.China, accessed date 
February 19, 2015, http://www.shenzhenoffice.org/aboutsz/Facts_Figures.htm.  
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Figure 2.  Shenzhen Export Value (1980–2000)164 
However, it is unclear if other SEZs follow the same developing model. In 2010, 
a large banner that read, “Learn from Shenzhen, Pay Tribute to Shenzhen” hung in 
Kashgar’s People’s Square. Kashgar is growing. Kashgar Airport is Xinjiang’s second 
busiest airport. It accommodates China’s longest interstate air route of 7.5 hours from 
Kashgar to Shenzhen. China’s vision is to build a “Silk Road in the air” that will connect 
the XUAR to Central Asia, East Asia, and Europe.165 Although the government invested 
in Kashgar’s infrastructure, such as the airport, it is uncertain whether Kashgar can 
develop as successfully as Shenzhen. Shenzhen has the advantage of being a coastal city 
located close to Hong Kong in the Pearl River Delta area, which has attracted a lot of 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI).166 
164 “Facts and Figures.”  
165 Cui Jia, “A Silk Road in the Air,” China Daily, International ed, (December 31, 2014), 
http://search.proquest.com.libproxy.nps.edu/docview/1640916720/DA7C99D33C4C4BA3PQ/1?accountid
=12702.  
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International Politics 50, no 3 (March 22, 2013), http://www.palgrave-
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Kashgar may be less likely to attract such FDI as it is landlocked by mountains 
and desert.167 China’s hope is that financial aid and infrastructure improvements will 
encourage foreign and domestic investors to see the same potentials in Kashgar as they 
saw in Shenzhen,168 However, because Shenzhen and Kashgar are drastically different, 
Wang Ning, director of the Economic Research Institute at the Xinjiang Academy of 
Social Sciences in Urumqi, and her team proposed a tailored model for Kashgar. 
Shenzhen is an industrialized city with a heavy emphasis in manufacturing, high-tech and 
finance. While the Shenzhen model worked for China’s major coastal cities, Wang 
proposed that in the early phase, Kashgar’s economic development should focus on 
tourism, while being supported by growth in agriculture, manufacturing and local service 
industries. Kashgar should start by capitalizing on its rich culture, old architecture and 
native art scene. After tourism matures, manufacturing and other sectors are likely to 
follow.169 
D. DEVELOPMENT BEYOND CHINA’S BORDERS 
In addition to domestic economic development in Xinjiang, China invests heavily 
in energy across the western border with its Central Asian neighbors. Central Asia has 
resources, and China needs more energy than Xinjiang can provide. Xinjiang plays an 
important role as the gateway and land bridge between China and Central Asia for 
pipelines and infrastructures. The PRC’s rapid economic growth in recent years resulted 
in energy consumption being outpaced by production. 
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Figure 3.  China’s Oil Production and Consumption (1993–2015)170 
The Chinese government is well aware that an energy shortage in China could 
damage the nation. Negative economic performance may cause instability, which the 
government dreads, especially in Xinjiang, because economic instability can lead to 
ethnic instability. China must seek energy beyond its borders. Since 1995, China has 
become dependent on energy imports. Central Asian states are supporting China’s 
development with their resources.171  
1. Xinjiang: The Gateway and Land Bridge to Foreign Investment 
Xinjiang is crucial to Beijing’s energy investment in Central Asia; it shares 3,700 
kilometers of border with its western neighbors, and it is the only gateway and land 
bridge between the PRC’s core provinces and Central Asia. As a transport corridor and 
resource hub, the resources that flow through the XUAR are important for uninterrupted 
supply and continuous industrialization from Xinjiang to the South and East China 
170 “China,” U.S. Energy Information Administration, February 4, 2014, 
http://www.eia.gov/countries/analysisbriefs/China/china.pdf. 
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Seas.172 The XUAR is also the crossroad for imports and exports of resources from South 
Asia, the Middle East, Eurasia and Europe. Its crossroad explains President Xi’s reason 
for reviving the Silk Road with commerce expanding in several directions from Xinjiang. 
Pipelines and transportation infrastructures have been, and are being, built to connect the 
China Seas’ coastal centers, Xinjiang, South and Central Asian states, Europe, and the 
Indian Ocean Basin  
2. Central Asia Resources 
After the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, international oil companies quickly 
purchased newly available Central Asian republics’ resources. Unlike international 
companies, China did not take immediate action. The Chinese National Petroleum 
Corporation (CNPC) waited until 1997 to purchase its first oil and gas field, 
Kazakhstan’s Aktobe field. In 2005, CNPC spent $4.2 billion to acquire a 67 percent 
stake in PetroKazakhstan. 173 In 2009, CNPC cooperated with KazMunaiGas, and spent 
$2.6 billion to buy MungistauMunaiGas. Other Chinese investors such as Sinopec, 
Sinochem, China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) and China International 
Trust and Investment Corporation (CITIC) invested, to a lesser degree, in Kazakhstan’s 
oil and gas industry. By 2010, China possessed 23 percent of Kazakhstan’s oil production 
shares. In 2009, China invested with Turkmenistan. China Development Bank loaned $4 
billion to Turkmengaz to build the Galkynysh gas field. Instead of financing the loan with 
currency, the parties agreed to pay back with natural gas exports to China.174  
Even though Xinjiang’s Tarim Basin has untapped oil reserves, the government is 
aware that the amount is insufficient to meet the PRC’s continuous energy demands. 
Therefore, to ensure China has enough energy to support its economic growth, the PRC 
has been heavily dependent in Kazakhstan’s and Turkmenistan’s ample oil and gas 
supply.175  
172 “China’s Growing Interest in Central Asia,” YouTube video, 4:07, posted by “STRATFORvideo” 
on September 27, 2013, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UK-Ghu_nqIQ. 
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Kazakhstan owns approximately two percent of the world’s proven oil reserves, 
and possibly a larger unproven reserve. The proven reserve is enough to supply China 
with nearly six years of oil. In 2011, Kazakhstan produced 1.8 million and Turkmenistan 
produced 200,000 barrels of oil a day.  
Turkmenistan, in the meantime, possesses 11.7 percent of the world’s proven gas 
reserves, an equivalent of roughly one-third of Europe and Eurasia’s gas. Its gas reserve, 
which is the largest in Central Asia, is enough to supply China with nearly twenty years 
of gas.176  
As for natural gas, Kazakhstan produced two billion cubic feet (.057 billion cubic 
meters) daily, while Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan each produced six billion cubic feet 
(.17 billion cubic meters) of natural gas. Eight billion cubic feet (.23 billion cubic meter) 
of natural gas a day meets almost a third of Chinese’s daily demand.177 
3. Infrastructure 
Ever since Central Asian republics gained their independence, the region was 
primed to expand its trade. China reciprocated with great interest.178 In 1997, the PRC 
and Kazakhstan started cooperating with an intergovernmental agreement about 
collaborating in oil and gas fields. One such project was the Central Asia-China gas and 
oil pipelines to transport resources from the west to the China Seas. The two states also 
linked rail lines to connect people from the China Sea to the Atlantic Ocean. 
In September 2004, shortly after the 4,200 km West-to-East pipeline started 
delivering oil from the Tarim Basin to Shanghai, Kazakhstan’s President Nursultan 
Abishevich Nazarbayev and President Hu, signed a contract worth $3.3 billion179 to 
extend the pipeline from the Tarim Basin another 2,830 km to Atasu in north-western 
176 Economy and Levi, By All Means Necessary, 148. 
177 Ibid., 149. 
178 Pannell & Schmidt, “Structural Change and Regional Disparities in Xinjiang, China,” 334. 
179 Bernat, “The Uyghur Question and What is Behind It.” 
 33 
                                                 
Kazakhstan.180 The pipeline was essential to meet China’s energy demand, and was 
portrayed as “a bridge of friendship between two people.”181 In November 2005, the 
transnational Atasu pipeline was completed.182 During the same meeting, the two 
presidents also signed other agreements to jointly explore and develop oil and gas 
resources in the Caspian Sea, and considered plans for a natural gas pipeline to connect 
gas fields in the Caspian Sea to China.  
Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan also cooperated with China to build pipelines. On 
April 3, 2006, the late Turkmen President Saparmurat Niyazov, and President Hu signed 
an agreement to collaborate on oil and gas, such as a Turkmenistan-China gas pipeline. 
Ever since the agreement was signed, the three countries swiftly completed the 
construction of Lines A and B.183 The 1,830 km Line-C construction started in 
September, 2012. A year later, the pipelines were welded, allowing the initial segment of 
the Central Asia–China Gas Pipeline in Uzbekistan to operate. Starting from Gedaim on 
the border of Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, Line-C runs parallel with Lines-A and -B. 
Line-C, then, enters China at Horgos, Xinjiang, to link up with the third West-East Gas 
Pipeline. By the end of 2015, the Line-C supporting facilities will be completed, which 
will allow Line-C to operate in full capability to transport 25 billion cubic meters per 
annum184 (bcm/a).185 The combined delivery capacity of the three lines of the Central 
Asia-China Gas Pipeline will amount to 55 bcm/a. Aside from satisfying 20 percent of 
China’s natural gas demand, replacing standard coal with natural gas will reduce carbon 
dioxide and sulfur dioxide emissions.186  
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In September 2013, Tajikistan’s President Rahmon Emomali and China’s 
President Xi participated in the opening ceremony for the construction of the fourth 
Central Asia-China Line-D gas pipeline.187 The 620-mile (998-kilometer) pipeline will 
start operating from the Galkynysh field in Turkmenistan at approximately one bcm/a.188 
The route for gas pipeline networks A, B and C’s is Turkmenistan-Uzbekistan-
Kazakhstan-China, while line-D’s route is Turkmenistan-Uzbekistan-Tajikistan-
Kyrgyzstan-China.189 The four operational pipelines will have a combined capacity of 80 
bcm/a of gas to China, meeting 40 percent of the PRC’s overall imported gas supplies.190 
Line-D is expected to come online in 2016 to increase China’s gas import and meet the 
PRC’s demands.191 
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III. ECONOMIC GROWTH AND REGIONAL INSTABILITY 
China’s economic development plan in Xinjiang has not reduced ethnic conflict in 
the region. Since 1978, China’s market reform from state-owned enterprise to a free 
market model led to 10 percent average annual GDP growth, and alleviated 500 million 
or more people from poverty.192 In the eyes of the PRC, economic development should 
have the side effect of fostering better social relations. The ideas that higher income, 
better living conditions, and more chances to lead a better life, generally calms restless 
people on the edge of survival. Economic development in Xinjiang, paradoxically, seem 
to increase ethnic conflict due the interplay of new economic such as Han migration, 
income disparity, and restrictive and discriminatory policies and practices with existing 
social factors such as religion, education and alienation.  
A. HAN MIGRANTS 
The Han migration to Xinjiang is one cause of instability in the region. Unlike 
bingtuaner (Chinese for military corps),whom Uyghurs looked upon more favorably, 
Uyghurs’ opinions of some contemporary migrants are negative. Between 1950s to 
1970s, the Mao-era, migrants such as convicts, state-mandated border supporters 
(soldiers), and workers sent for state resettlement purposes, for the most part, adapted to 
the Uyghur environment and lifestyle, and made the region their home.193 Some Hans 
even identified themselves as Xinjiangren, or natives of Xinjiang, or Lao Xinjiang, 
meaning old Xinjiang native.194  
This section will touch on early migrations, the perception of migration, the for-
profit migrants, the disorder migrants bring to the region, the socially displaced migrants 
and how the Uyghurs and Hans needs each other to develop the region and state. 
192 Beardson, Stumbling Giant, 3. 
193 Fuller and Starr, The Xinjiang Problem, 11–12. 
194 Agnieszka Joniak-Luthi, “Han Migration to Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region: Between State 
Schemes and Migrants’ Strategies,” Dietrich Reimer Verlag, 2013, 170. 
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The early Han migrants to the XUAR were soldiers. After the PLA took control 
of Xinjiang in 1949, soldiers remained to work in areas such as agriculture and animal 
husbandry, road building, irrigation channel construction and industrial development. In 
1954, Beijing established a state-run military organization call PCC, or the bingtuan to 
administer 100,000 demobilized soldiers, who became known as bingtuaners. The PCC 
had jurisdiction over areas scattered throughout the region that totaled the size of two 
Taiwans. The soldiers were given land and they settled in Xinjiang.195 
The government’s “go west” plans to benefit the XUAR are often perceived 
differently by the Uyghurs. To develop the XUAR, the Chinese government established 
programs to benefit everyone involved. Many Uyghurs cannot associatee Han migration 
to benefiting local ethnic minorities. For instance, the “Develop the West” campaign was 
an initiative to recruit millions of Han laborers to move to the western borderlands to 
build road, railroad, and infrastructure construction.196 Uyghurs view of the 
government’s push for the Han Chinese to move west was interpreted as a CCP motive to 
weaken the Uyghurs’ status. Also, Uyghurs perceive Han migrants as given the better 
paying jobs, while Uyghurs occupy the lower paying and harder labor jobs.197 By the late 
1980s, the push to the west attracted and brought in profit-driven migrants. Due to 
relaxed household registrations, contemporary migrants have options to be mobile, 
flexible, and indeterminate stay.198  
Due to this fact, recent migrants, or “self drifters,” voluntarily left their hukou 
(household registration) in search of a better life.199 While migrants may have voluntarily 
moved to seek profit, central and local governments may have also created favorable 
environments to entice companies to build factories, and lure people with skills to move 
and work in Xinjiang. The migrant pool, however, did not necessarily match with the 
195 “Circling the Wagons,” The Economist, May 25, 2013, 
http://www.economist.com/news/china/21578433-region-plagued-ethnic-strife-growth-immigrant-
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government’s intention. Instead of attracting skilled personnel and long-term settlers to 
Xinjiang, many recent migrants are seasonal and temporary peasant workers and 
entrepreneurs who are in the XUAR with only profit in mind.200 In turn, Xinjiang’s Han 
demographic problem is not all within the CCP’s control.201 
For-profit migrants flocked to Xinjiang in the 1980s when the region was 
presented as “the land of opportunity where…money can be easily earned.”202 Whether 
migrants were resettled by the government or individually motivated to go to the XUAR, 
net migration to work large industries and construction projects increased. In the 
beginning, Xinjiang offered employment to Han migrants to work in the industrialized 
north of the Tengri Tagh/Tianshan Mountains. Due to tax breaks and inexpensive land, 
private and state-owned enterprises from eastern China invested in Xinjiang. Han 
migration continued into southern Xinjiang, particularly to work the railway and road 
construction sites, urban construction projects, Taklamakan Desert’s oil fields, Tarim 
Basin extraction sites, and Aqsu and Kashgar cotton fields. On the surface, economic 
growth may seem to profit the XUAR, but data collected between 2011 and 2012 proved 
that most of these enterprises used Han Chinese labor, not Uyghurs.   
Seasonal and temporary migrants to Xinjiang sometimes referred to as the 
“Floating Population,”203 bring disorder to the region.204 They do not observe local 
regulations nor have a settlement pattern, which is a challenge to the CCP. Han migrants 
have threatened the XUAR’s social stability such as with the birth-control policy. They 
breach one-child policy, and do not necessarily adhere to the local law and order.205 
Without the prospect to permanently settle, a Han Chinese once said during an interview, 
“Xinjiang is not a place you want to live after retirement.”206 For this reason, even after 
200 Joniak-Luthi, “Han Migration to Xinjiang,” 168. 
201 Fuller and Starr, The Xinjiang Problem, 11–12. 
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years of living in Xinjiang, many Hans keep their original hukou status and do not see the 
need to establish hukou in the region where they are making money. For example, rural 
farmers with farmland can lease their land during their absence from their hukou. They 
benefit from additional rental income and the money they make in Xinjiang. Floaters are 
self-driven and susceptible to relocating to the next employment opportunity. The 
government is suspicious of floaters because their patterns are erratic and most do not 
satisfy the CCP’s plan of increasing Han settlement in the XUAR.207  
Another negative Han migrant factor is perceived social displacement. Some Han 
migrants had difficulties integrating with society. Some migrated to the UAR only for 
money and not the people, land, or culture. Many profit-driven Han entrepreneurs bring 
their families with them but have no intention to stay. While there are floaters, some 
migrants have transferred their hukou so their children receive education and health care.  
In the meantime, some migrants become socially dissatisfied because they do not 
feel compatible even with those from their native home. For example, due to dialectic 
differences, Hans do not understand, relate or associate with all Hans. As an example, a 
Sichuanese will most likely socialize with a Sichuanese instead of a Cantonese because 
their language and possibly, culture are differences.  
Social displacement can be a problem among Uyghurs and Hans, and Hans and 
Hans. Some migrants are so intimidated by the local language and culture that they 
preserve close ties with their families back home, shop in stores with products and 
produce they are familiar with, cook their own traditional dishes, eat at restaurants that 
serve their own specialties, and socialize with their “fellow natives.”208 Some of these 
migrants earn money and remain socially segregated. The negative depiction reinforces 
Uyghurs’ and long-term Han settlers’ negative perception that floaters are in Xinjiang 
only to make profit; lack ecological interest; are nonchalant with the people, history, 
culture and land; and voided responsibility for the region.  
 
207 Joniak-Luthi, “Han Migration to Xinjiang,” 169. 
208 Ibid., 170. 
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B. INCOME DISPARITY 
Income disparity is another destabilizing factor between the Hans and ethnic 
minorities. Income disparity between urban-rural zone in Xinjiang stemmed from the 
Mao era when state-owned projects such as the Xinjiang Production and Construction 
Corps (XPCC) and construction and development of natural resources were dominated by 
Hans. Hans tended to own companies and manage private- and state- owned transport and 
telecommunications industries.209 Uyghurs lived in unfavorable locations that lacked 
infrastructure and human resources, which negatively affected their economic 
development and income. This section will use two examples to explain Uyghur-Han 
income disparity: spatial segregation and a study conducted by Anthony Howell and C. 
Cindy Fan specifically on market differences and wage gaps in Urumqi. 
 
Figure 4.  Spatial Distributions of Different Ethnic Groups in Xinjiang, 
Western China210 
209 Cao, “Urban-Rural Income Disparity and Urbanization,” 969. 
210 Ibid., 970. 
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Uyghur-Han spatial distribution is split into two: ethnic minorities dominate the 
less developed and agricultural rural southern Xinjiang and the majority of Hans live in 
modern and developed urban centers of northern Xinjiang. Southern Xinjiang is 
composed primarily of Uyghurs living in rural areas. One quarter of Xinjiang’s cities are 
located in the southern region. Agriculture is the base of the southern economy. While 47 
percent of the XUAR population lives in this region, 90 percent are ethnic minorities. 
This region is geographically disadvantaged with socio-economic obstacles. The region 
lacks infrastructure, especially roads. The attempt to transport produce to Urumqi is a 
great challenge for minorities.211 The government designated 20 of its 25 counties 
“poverty-stricken counties.”212 
Northern Xinjiang, where most Han urban dwellers live, is more urbanized, 
industrialized and developed. The Tianshan economic belt on the northern slope, for 
example, has developed transportation infrastructure, copious human capital and rich 
natural resources. The area provides all the ingredients for economic development. While 
the area covers only five percent of the XUAR’s territory, 20 percent of Xinjiang’s 








211 Cao, “Urban-Rural Income Disparity and Urbanization,” 975. 
212 Ibid., 972. 
213 Ibid. 
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Table 1.   Demography of Urban Uyghurs and Hans in Xinjiang (2002)214 





Han Population (%) Per Capita GDP 
(yuan) 
Karamay (north) 13.6 77.9 43,926 
Urumqi (north) 12.8 73.2 16,493 
Turpan (north) 69.6 23.5 12,831 
Shihezi (north) 1.2 94.6 9,738 
Changji (north) 4.0 74.8 8,399 
Kumul (north) 18.4 68.7 7,351 
Ili (north) 15.9 44.9 5,344 
Aksu (south) 74.9 25.0 4,939 
Kashgar (south) 89.2 9.1 2,411 
Khotan (south) 90.7 3.0 1,643 
Source: 2002 Xinjiang tongji nianjian, op. cit., pp. 106, 110–115, 713, 715; 2002 Zhonguo tongji nianjian, op. cit., p. 51.  
 
Educational disparity is a factor that increases the income gap. Southern 
Xinjiang’s illiteracy rate ranges from 8.7 percent to 14.2 percent. The eastern side of 
Xinjiang ranges from 6.5 to 8.7 percent. The most northern part of the XUAR ranges 
from 2.2 to 6.5 percent.215 The urban-rural income disparity is due arguably to 
inadequate education in rural areas. Less educated Uyghurs create less skilled and 
insufficient labor in remote minority areas and in the cities. This analysis may explain the 
large Han-Uyghur income gap and Uyghurs’ slow but rising quality of life , as compared 
to the Han. 
Howell and Fan conducted a study in 2008 that focused on Urumqi Uyghur 
migrants’ and Han migrants’ choice of markets, and how their differences affected their 
wage gaps. A 2008 statistic illustrated that since 2005, 11 percent of Uyghurs received 
pay raises, while 36 percent of Hans received pay raises. Also, the Uyghur-Han wage gap 
in the XUAR averaged 28 percent higher for the Hans without consideration for their 
214 Remi Castets, “The Uyghurs in Xinjiang-The Malaise Grows,” China Perspectives, September 
2003, http://chinaperspectives.revues.org/648. 
215 Cao, “Urban-Rural Income Disparity and Urbanization,” 975. 
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professions.216 This particular study, using specific parameters, showed that urban 
Uyghur migrants’ wages were not at a disadvantage compared to Han migrants.217  
Sources often suggest that Uyghurs are economically disadvantaged when 
compared to Hans. For instance, Howell conducted another study that combined 
ethnicity, gender and migrant status. This research revealed that Uyghur native, compared 
to Han natives and Han migrants, had the greatest disadvantage regarding income 
disparity.  
C. EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATORY PRACTICES 
This section will cover historical discriminatory labor practices, the labor law, and 
more recent employment discriminatory practices.  
Employment discrimination in the XUAR is not a new phenomenon. During the 
early Republican era, Hans, not Uyghurs, occupied Xinjiang province and subprovince 
official positions. Han officials deprived the Uyghurs of a fair chance in politics and 
employment, and further invited Han migrants to the region to settle. Officials would 
entice Han migrants to settle by presenting them with favoritism, such as gifting them 
with prime farmland take from Uyghurs who had been evicted.218 
On July 5, 1994 the Eighth National People’s Congress promulgated the Labour 
Law of the People’s Republic of China.219 Article 12 states: “Labourers shall not be 
discriminated against in employment due to their nationality, race, sex, or religious 
belief.”220 Article 14 declares: “In respect of the employment of the disabled, people of 
minority ethnic groups, and demobilized army men, where there are special stipulations 
216 Anthony J. Howell, “Chinese Minority Income Disparity in the Informal Economy: A Cross-
Sectoral Analysis of Han-Uyghur Labour Market Outcomes in Urumqi’s Formal and Informal Sectors 
Using Survey Data,” CIJ 11, no. 3 (December 2013): 17, 
http://www.tonyjhowell.com/papers/Minority_income_disparity_in_Xinjiange.pdf.  
217 Howell and Fan, “Migration and Inequality in Xinjiang,” 132–133. 
218 Gardner Bovingdon, “Autonomy in Xinjang Han Nationalist Imperatives and Uyghur Discontent,” 
East-West Center Washington, Policy Studies 1–96, 5. 
219 Database of Laws and Regulations, accessed date March 9, 2015, 
http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/12/content_1383754.htm.  
220 “Labour Law of the People’s Republic of China,” China.Org.CN, accessed date March 9, 2015, 
http://www.china.org.cn/living_in_china/abc/2009-07/15/content_18140508.htm.  
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in laws, rules and regulations, such stipulations shall apply.”221 While the PRC now has a 
labor law in place, adherence to regulation is another matter. 
Discriminatory employment practices are still present in Xinjiang. Uyghurs feel 
insignificant in the region’s administrative, technical, and professional arena because the 
high-skill service sector predominately hires Hans. Scholars have also noted that in 
Xinjiang, Han migrants “are given priority over minorities in obtaining urban 
employment, a source of persistent inequality between Han and minorities.”222 To give 
minorities bigger advantages, the PRC has been enforcing hiring quotas for State-owned-
enterprises (SOE).  
Since the late 1970s, SOEs have been required to employ a certain percent of 
minorities. The exact quota percentage was difficult to locate and the number gap 
between each source varied a lot: James Leibold stated that there was a 70 percent 
quota,223 Shan and Weng quoted no less than more than 60 percent,224 and Shan and 
Chen stated 15 percent of SOE employees, management included, to be ethnic 
minorities.225 During the 1970s, the state sector endowed the region with GDP growth. 
Since the SOEs had lots of industrial and service job positions, they hired as many 
Kazakhs, Uyghurs, and other non-Hans as they could.226 As private enterprises 
flourished, SOEs shrank. More and more minorities had to quit the SOE and search for 
private sector jobs. Private companies, though, were not bound by the preferential policy 
as the SOEs were. Private owners had the freedom to choose; many chose not to hire 
Uyghurs because they did not have the technical and language skills that the employers 
221 “Labour Law of the People’s Republic of China.” 
222 Howell and Fan, “Migration and Inequality in Xinjiang,” 121. 
223 James Leibold, “Xinjiang Work Forum Marks New Policy of ‘Ethnic Mingling,” The Jamestown 
Foundation 14, no. 12 (June 19, 2014), 
http://www.jamestown.org/regions/chinaasiapacific/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=42518&tx_ttnews
%5BbackPid%5D=52&cHash=e382c60e99ad9bfe6cd7453376dc25a0#.VQyqjdJ4omw. 
224 Shan Wei and Chen Gang, “The Urumqi Riots and China’s Ethnic Policy in Xinjiang,” East Asian 
Policy 11, no. 3, XX, http://www.eai.nus.edu.sg/Vol1No3_ShanweiChenGang.pdf.   
225 Shan Wei and Chen Gang,”The Urumqi Riots and China’s Ethnic Policy in Xinjiang,” East Asian 
Policy, 14–22 (20),http://www.eai.nus.edu.sg/Vol1No3_ShanweiChenGang.pdf.   
226 Gardner Bovingdon, “Autonomy in Xinjang Han Nationalist Imperatives and Uyghur Discontent,” 
East-West Center Washington, Policy Studies 1–96,38. 
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needed.227 Without the necessary skills, Uyghurs were at a disadvantage when compared 
to Hans in the private sector.  
In the late 1990s, some private enterprises advertised jobs, but indicated that 
Uyghurs, whether conspicuously or inconspicuously, “need not apply.”228 Employers 
were so hesitant to hire non-Hans that Uyghur parents “paid substantial bribes to officials 
in hopes of securing desirable jobs for their children.”229 Meanwhile, the CCP 
encouraged large-scale SOEs, such as energy giants PetroChina and Sinopec, to invest 
and develop in the Tarim Basin region. Unlike the earlier SOEs which had to meet ethnic 
minority hiring quotas, these SOEs employ Hans due to their technical skills. On another 
note, these SOEs pay income tax to Beijing or Shanghai instead of Xinjiang because 
“they are registered in Beijing with their oil and gas pipeline subsidiaries registered in 
Shanghai.”230 The discrimination and tax factors intensified economic disparity between 
minorities and Han in Xinjiang and the rest of the PRC. 
D. OTHER DESTABILIZING FACTORS IN XINJIANG 
Xinjiang’s economic development has negatively affected ethnic stability because 
factors related to economic growth such as Han migration, income disparity and 
discrimination practices compounded the existing complex mix of destabilizing factors. 
Other destabilizing factors include, but are not limited to, social displacement, 
assimilation, colonization, cultural suppression education, lack of autonomy or 
independence, politics and strong nationalism.231 This section will focus on religion and 
education, and how each created tension among Uyghurs and Hans in the region.  
227 Wei and Cuifen, “China’s New Policy in Xinjiang,” 59–60. 
228 Bruce Gilley, “Uighurs Need not Apply,” Far Eastern Economic Review 164, no. 33 (August 23, 
2001): 26. 
229 Gardner Bovingdon, “Autonomy in Xinjang Han Nationalist Imperatives and Uyghur Discontent,” 
East-West Center Washington, Policy Studies 1–96, 39. 
230 Wei and Cuifen, “China’s New Policy in Xinjiang,” 60. 
231 Bovingdon, The Uyghurs, Strangers in Their Own Land, 3. 
 46 
                                                 
1. Religion 
Religious tensions between Uyghurs and the government are major causes of 
minority unrest.232 Because religion is tightly interconnected to many facets of Uyghurs’ 
lives, nearly any act of dissent can qualify as religiously motivated.  
In the early 1980s, many Xinjiang public schools were secular and restricted from 
religious teachings. Religious educational deprivation led many Uyghur students in 
Xinjiang to quit their secular education with the public school. Instead, they attended 
private Muslim academic institutions called madrassas.233 Uyghur parents wanted their 
children to learn Islamic traditions, values, rituals and scripts instead of the government’s 
secular teachings. This demand for institutions with Islamic teachings eventually 
contributed to the introduction of underground Islamic sects in Xinjiang.  
Cultural factors, such as religion, have been a pivotal element of ethnic instability 
in the XUAR. For example, Xinjiang legislators passed a law in December 2014 that 
banned the wearing of burqas in public. Because Islam is woven into every aspect of 
Uyghurs’ lives, restricting cultural garments may easily be interpreted as religious 
suppression even though “burqas are not traditional dress for Uygur women, and wearing 
them in public places is banned in countries such as Belgium and France.”234 Still, local 
legislators instituted the ordinance in response to a spate of violent attacks, such as the 
March 1, 2014 attack at Kunming’s railway station where attackers with knives stabbed 
31 people to death and wounded 141.235 Aside from the ban on burqa, in August 2014, 
due to a sport competition in Karamay, the XUAR temporarily prohibited passengers 
with long beards, head scarves, veils, hijab, burqas, and garments with Islamic crescent 
and star symbols to board public transportation.236 The government took security 
232 Sun, “The Roots of China’s Ethnic Conflicts,” 232. 
233 Ibid. 
234 Frances Martel, “China Passes Burqa Ban in its Largest Muslim City,” Breitbart, January 13, 2015, 
http://www.breitbart.com/national-security/2015/01/13/china-passes-burqa-ban-in-its-largest-muslim-city/. 
235 Katie Hunt, “4 Found Guilty of Railway Station Knife Attack in China,” CNN, September 12, 
2014, http://www.cnn.com/2014/09/12/world/asia/china-kunming-attack-trial/. 
236 Loveday Wright, “Xinjiang: Restrictions on Religion May Lead to ‘Uighur Radicalization,’” DW, 
August 8, 2014, http://www.dw.de/xinjiang-restrictions-on-religion-may-lead-to-uighur-radicalization/a-
17841070.  
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measures in an effort to curb potential Islamic terrorism in China.237 One last example: 
during 2014’s Ramadan, certain students, teachers and government employees were 
banned from fasting because the government feared fasting would lead to violence. 
Observers claimed that during “Ramadan rage,” the combination of fatigue, thirst, and 
hunger contributed to the increase of violent acts—deaths, assaults, disputes, fights, 
accidents, burning of religious structures, and beating of women and children.238  
Understanding the PRC’s response to past violence may help one see why local 
and state governments administer certain restrictions against contemporary conflicts. 
Without the background information, one could misinterpret the government’s actions as 
religious suppression rather than security measures.239 Understanding the minority 
actions that caused the government to implement certain religious policies may reveal 
that the government is putting effort into stabilizing the region. Nonetheless, despite 
government efforts, religious policies are widening the cultural gap between the XUAR 
and the state.240  
2. Education 
The education system in Xinjiang is another factor that causes friction between 
ethnic minorities and Hans. Hans claim reverse discrimination due to preferential 
treatments that give ethnic minorities advantages on their college entrance exams.241 
Uyghurs, in the meantime, are not content to participate in bilingual education.  
Han students in Xinjiang feel that educational preferential treatment is reverse 
discrimination due to colleges’ different admission criteria that favor minorities, crippling 
Hans’ chances. Ethnic minorities are given extra points for their college entrance 
237 Martel, “China Passes Burqa Ban.”  
238 Jeremy Wilson, “Ramadan Rage: How Crime Increases During the Muslim Holy Month,” 
Breitbart, July 7, 2014, http://www.breitbart.com/Breitbart-London/2014/07/07/Ramadan-Rage-How-
Crime-Increases-During-the-Muslim-Holy-Month.  
239 Wright, “Xinjiang: Restrictions on Religion.” 
240 Ibid. 
241 Sun, “The Roots of China’s Ethnic Conflicts,” 236. 
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exams.242 For example, in 2004, minorities who took the Mandarin (or Putonghua, 
meaning “common speech”243) exam were awarded 50 points if both their parents were 
minority, or 10 points if one parent was a minority.244 In more disadvantaged regions, 
minorities have the option to take college entrance exams in Mandarin or Uyghur. The 
exam in Uyghur is easier in content than the Mandarin exam, and the minority students 
are still supplemented with ample extra points.245 Nevertheless, the score gap between 
minorities and Hans has been narrowing.246  
Preferential policies encouraged, developed and trained a sizeable pool of 
minorities in a number of fields. A 2009 survey conducted by the Xinjiang Bureau of 
Education showed 89,538 (37.5 percent of the total enrollment)247 minorities in tertiary 
institutions, and 1,705 (14.65 percent of the total enrollment) minorities in postgraduate 
school. Nonetheless, without preferential hiring policies, minority graduates experience 
fewer employment opportunities than Han graduates.248 Critics of the preferential policy 
argued that lower academic standards and lack of Mandarin fluency for minorities 
negatively affected their post-college employment prospects. Henceforth, to level the 
playing field for minorities and Hans, the PRC instituted bilingual education, specifically 
Mandarin and the native language, in colleges to enhance minorities’ competitiveness 
with Hans.249  
The ability to speak Mandarin and another language promotes upward movement, 
but minorities have reservations about the educational plan. China’s legislation gives 
Xinjiang’s education administration the freedom to develop its own education program. 
242 Sun, “The Roots of China’s Ethnic Conflicts,” 236. 
243 Qiu Gui Su, “Putonghua-Standard Mandarin Chinese,” About Education, accessed date March 12, 
2015, http://mandarin.about.com/od/chineseculture/a/Putonghua-Standard-Mandarin-Chinese.htm.  
244 James Leibold, Minority Education in China: Balancing Unity and Diversity in an Era of Critical 
Pluralism, (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2014) 142. 




249 Sun, “The Roots of China’s Ethnic Conflicts,” 236. 
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The XUAR has two types of schools: minority and Hans.250 As long as a language has a 
written script, minorities are permitted to have separate schools using their native 
language for primary instruction; Kazakh schools speak Kazakh, and Uyghur schools 
speak Uyghur. Both schools also learn Mandarin as a second language starting in grade 
three. Han schools, on the other hand, speak Mandarin but their second language is 
English.251 Minority school students, though started bilingual education since third grade, 
may not be proficient in both the minority language and Mandarin.252 Their low 
competency in Mandarin could be a contributor to their lack of competitiveness in the job 
market against Hans, which often leads to friction between the minorities and Hans. 
 
Figure 5.  Number of Violent Incidents between Uyghurs and Hans (1980–
2014)253, 254  
  
250 Ablimit Baki, “Language Contact Between Uyghur and Chinese in Xinjiang, PRC: Uyghur 
Elements in Xinjiang Putonghua,” Academia.edu, 2012 (41-62) 47, 
http://www.academia.edu/1770107/Language_Contact_between_Uyghur_and_Chinese_in_Xinjiang_Uygh
ur_Elements_in_Xinjiang_Putonghua.  
251 Baki, “Language Contact Between Uyghur and Chinese,” 47. 
252 Ibid. 
253 “Uyghurs: The Troubled Fate of a Minority,” Radio Free Asia, accessed date March 2, 2015, 
http://www.rfa.org/english/news/special/UyghurUnrest/Home.html. 
254 Bovingdon, The Uyghurs, Strangers in Their Own Land, 177–190. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
To the CCP, economic instability can lead to ethnic instability.255 China has been 
economically developing Xinjiang, in hopes that economic stability will decrease ethnic 
violence in the XUAR. Xinjiang’s economy has been growing steadily since the 
implementation of the “Western Development” Program. China is exploiting the region’s 
rich natural resources to meet the state’s energy demand. In addition, China is 
rejuvenating the Silk Road, which goes through the XUAR. Xinjiang is China’s gateway 
to the west; a crossroad for Russia, Kazakhstan and China; and the hub for traffic from 
South and Central Asia, the Middle East, and Europe. To geographically link the different 
states to Xinjiang, China and its neighbors have plans to improve the network and 
infrastructure along the Silk Road, which could enhance economic interaction, integration 
and cooperation. To further advance Xinjiang’s economy, the CCP designated Kashgar a 
SEZ to attract investors by giving investors breaks in finance, tax, industries, trade and 
land use. Moreover, China is investing in Central Asia’s natural resources to ensure the 
state has enough energy to sustain economic growth and stability. Central Asia and China 
have been cooperating in major pipeline and transportation infrastructure projects to 
connect the east coast of China to Europe. 
255 Aisen and Veiga, “How Does Political Instability Affect Economic Growth?,” 9. 
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Figure 6.  Province: Xinjiang256 
China’s economy is growing, but how is growth affecting ethnic stability in the 
XUAR? Is it a determining factor that either increases or decreases ethnic conflict, or is it 
merely a secondary factor? While Giglio argues that long-term economic development is 
a necessary component of Xinjiang’s ethnic stability, he believes the root cause of 
Xinjiang’s unrest is culture and religion.257 Bovingdon258 and Lim259 argue along the 
same lines that Xinjiang’s unrest has multiple causes. Xinjiang’s economic development 
created additional ethnic tension between minorities and Hans. Therefore, in addition to 
the existing social ethnic conflict factors, minorities and Hans have to deal with Han 
migration, income disparity and employment discrimination.  
Han migration is integral to the development of Xinjiang because Hans have the 
skills to build infrastructure.260  While the region is modernizing with highways, 
railroads, and telecommunications lines, which have been attracting an array of investors, 
256 “Province: Xinjiang.” 
257 Giglio, “Separatism and the War on Terror.” 
258 Bovingdon, Autonomy in Xinjiang, viii. 
259 Lim, “Religion, Ethnicity, and Economic,” iii.   
260 Wei and Cuifen, “China’s New Policy in Xinjiang,” 59–60. 
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Uyghurs perceive development benefiting Hans and not them.261 Furthermore, for-profit, 
temporary and seasonal migrants tend to bring disorder to the region.262   
Income disparity is generally perceived as being in favor of Hans, but after 
analyzing the contributing factors, such as spatial segregation, and Urumqi’s market 
differences and wage gaps, income disparity is more fluid. The gaps could narrow, or 
reverse, if minorities alter their social and professional characteristics to the majority of 
China. However, Howell and Fan’s study was specific to minority migrants and Han 
migrants in Urumqi.263 The complexities revealed by this work could shift the perception 
of income disparity and the outlook on opportunities available to minorities. Their 
individual job preferences can heavily determine wages compared to Hans. Nevertheless, 
if minorities do not see the potential of different job markets and continue to resist 
adaptation, then income disparity will persist, along with ethnic instability. 
Employment discrimination causes tension between minorities and Hans, 
especially when employers discriminate based on “nationality, race, sex, or religious 
belief.264 Minorities who are fluent in ethnic languages but not scientific and technical 
terms can hinder their capabilities to communicate, acquire a trade and be offered 
employment. Minorities may consider emphasizing their fluency in Mandarin. 
Proficiency in the national language can help them advance in the same trades Hans are 
learning, thereby reducing the chances of employment discrimination.  
Between the two social factors of religion and education, religion is more volatile 
than. The three economic destabilizing factors of Han migration, income disparity and 
employment discrimination. See appendix for a chart of incidents between Uyghurs and 
Hans. Religious differences, if allowed to escalate, can potentially destabilize Xinjiang’s 
economic development significantly. The existence of social conflicts can manifest into 
ethnic instability, which the CCP sees as a key threat to economic growth.265 
261 Fuller and Starr, The Xinjiang Problem, 5. 
262 Joniak-Luthi, “Han Migration to Xinjiang,” 169. 
263 Howell and Fan, “Migration and Inequality in Xinjiang,” 132–133. 
264 “Labour Law of the People’s Republic of China.”  
265 Beardson, Stumbling Giant, 6. 
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Chapter I introduced three possible hypotheses: 1) the PRC’s economic 
development plan for Xinjiang increases, 2) decreases, or is a 3) subsidiary component of 
ethnic conflict. Upon analyzing the XUAR’s economic growth and destabilizing factors, 
this paper argues and concludes that the PRC’s economic development plan affects ethnic 
stability in Xinjiang as a subsidiary factor.   
 
Figure 7.  Correllation of GDP of Xinjiang (1990–2012)266 with the Number of 
Violent Incidents Between Uyghurs and Hands267, 268 
Bovingdon’s 1949 to 2005 account of Xinjiang’s violent events (see the appendix 
for years 1980 to 2005) and Radio Free Asia’s 2008 to 2014 data (see Figure 7) further 
support this thesis’ findings. As the graph of Xinjiang’s GDP illustrates, the trend of 
economic growth since before the “Great Western Development” persistently increased. 
In the meantime, the violent incident graph between the years of 1980 and 2014 showed a 
trend of ebb and flow.  
Because the trends of the two graphs do not match, one can argue that ethnic 
conflict does not affect economic growth because, whether the number of violences rises 
or falls each year, economic growth continues to climb annually. On the other hand, this 
study argues that economic growth can affect ethnic stability in two ways: increasing 
ethnic instability, or decreasing ethnic instability.  
266 Yin Weiwen, “The Natural Resource Curse of Xinjiang,” accessed date march 10, 2015, 
http://www.pp.u-tokyo.ac.jp/courses/2014/documents/graspp2014-5140143-2b.pdf.  
267 “Uyghurs: The Troubled Fate of a Minority.” 
268 Bovingdon, The Uyghurs, Strangers in Their Own Land, 177–190. 
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One can argue that economic growth increases ethnic instability due to the 
addition of economic destabilizing factors to existing social factors. Han migration, 
income disparity and employment discrimination, together with religious suppression and 
education, may have exacerbated minorities’ pool of grievances. Minorities could 
potentially use these factors to mobilize and to justify their violent actions against the 
government, Han Chinese and other minorities. These combined social and economic 
factors could possibly explain the spike of incidents since 2011.  
In order to create long-term ethnic stability and economic development in 
Xinjiang, China needs to confront the deeper and more historical roots of the social 
factors that affect XUAR’s violent activities. The author argues that social factors effect 
stability the most when the economy is underdeveloped, or in the process of 
development. Once the region achieves a certain developmental threshold, the social 
factors can be lessened by the pursuit of stability and prosperity.  
If this brief assessment is plausible, it explains the PRC’s ongoing economic 
development in the XUAR, despite increasing or decreasing ethnic conflict. The social 
factors, which are the root of many conflicts, should be the PRC’s main focus. Long-term 
stability and prosperity in Xinjiang may require the CCP to institute fair policies, equal 
education opportunities and open communication. This thesis argued that Xinjiang’s 
economic growth can negatively and positively affect regional ethnic stability, but only 
as a subsidiary factor, as China continues to exploit Xinjiang’s natural resources, expand 
the Silk Road network, develop Kashgar into the next Shenzhen, and invest with its 
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APPENDIX 











4,000 Shanghai youths seeking right to return home 
1980-04-09 
(2 days) 
Aqsu Riot, clash 3,000 
Public Security Bureau (PSB) employee Huang 
Zhen killed a Uyghur “drunk” in custody; 
demonstrators paraded with the body, shouted 








Several hundred Uyghurs attack military organs, 
make trouble in barracks and on the street. 
Propaganda and “detaining the leaders of the 
troublemaking” resolved the problem. 
1980-08-02 
(Days) 
Urumci Shooting , riot  
Production and Construction Corp (PCC) clerk 
killed Uyghur farmer’s ox, then a Uyghur 
roadworker. After clerk received a death sentence, 
other Hans stormed jail and freed him. Later 
sentenced to manslaughter. 
1980-08-20 
(--) 
Qaghiliq Incident -- -- 
1980-11-12 
(40 days) 
Aqsu Riot (Hans) 8,000 
“Sent down” youths seeking to return home; 1,000 
staged a hunger strike; martial law in effect 
through December 26, 1980. 
1981-01-13 
(4 days) 
Qaghiliq Riot 2,000 
Talips rioted after a mosque fire, accusing a 
Uyghur PSB official as arsonist. Slogans: “Follow 
Allah,” “Long live the Islamic Republic,” “Kapirs 






Insurgents stole weapons, planned to establish an 
independent East Turkestan (ET) Republic; led by 
Hasan Ismayil, Dawut Sawut. 
1981-10-30 
(Days) 
Kashgar Riot, “racial 
incidents” 
6,000 
Riots after Han shot Uyghur youth with a hunting 
rifle. Rioters stormed the post office, party 
committee, bank; attacked 600, injured 200; 
shouted “Long live Uyghurstan/Islamic Republic, 






Later spread to Nanjing, Beijing, Shanghai; 2,000 
students from 7 universities involved. Students 
269 Bovingdon, The Uyghurs, Strangers in Their Own Land, 177–190. 
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(4-days) 
shouted separatist slogans: Hans out, Independent 
Xinjiang (XJ) sovereign; Yuan Qingli says 






s (Qazaq) -- 
Protest against “White house in the distance,” with 






Racist slogans on toilet door; demonstrations at 
major universities in Urumci; organized by 
“student scientific/cultural association’; Dolqun Isa 





(prison sites not 
revealed) 
Prison riot 80 
More than 80 prisoners at a remote labor reform 
farm used hammers and knives to kill guards, take 
hostages, and burn buildings. There had reportedly 
been 11 major riots in 23 camps with 96 escapes in 
the previous year. 
1989-05-13 
(1 day) 
Urumci Sit-in (Han) 130 
Former uranium mine workers protested problems 
of radiation sickness and also supported students. 
Met by government officials and PCC officials 
(who employed them). They were promised 




Urumci Demonstration -- -- 
1989-05-18 
(1 day) 
Urumci Demonstration -- -- 
1989-05-19 
(1 day) 
Urumci Riot 3,000 
Over the book Sexual customs, initially described 
as “orderly march in support of Beijing democracy 
movement”; degenerated into a riot; 1,000 PSB, 
1,200 People’s Army Police (PAP) dispatched. 
1989-06-05 
(1 day) 
Urumci Sit-in 100 
More than 100 students protested outside a district 




Qaghiliq County Demonstration 200 
Some 200 Talips petitioned the county government 
and “made trouble.” Although the trouble was 
squelched expeditiously, the Uyghur imam was 
criticized for dereliction of duty. 
1990-03-25 
(1 day) 
Moyu County Arson -- 
A small group of people reportedly led by Talips 
burned the family-planning technology station 






















Armed rebellion calling for independence, political 
parties, minzu army; armed demonstrators 
occupied Tacheng government building, demanded 
government “hand over power”; gunfight left 140 







Demonstration for democratic elections, some 
called for right to join Soviet Union, looting, 
shootings, 500 killed or wounded. 
1992-02 
(--) 
Ghulja Bombing -- -- 
1992-02-05 
(1 day) 
Ruumci Bombing -- 
A series of bombings reported; January 21 







Bombings -- -- 
1993-03 
(--) 
Lop Nor Demonstration 1,000 Antinuclear. 
1993-06 
(--) 
Ili region Kazakhs clash -- -- 
1993-06-17 
(1 day) 
Kashgar Bombing -- 
Attack on government; January 21 document 
claims bombings continued through September; 






-- Targeted Hamundun Niyaz, chairman of the 
XUAR People’s Target 
1993-08-01 
(1 day) 
Yarkand Bombing -- In the video parlor of a trade company. 
1993-08-04 
(--) 
Kashgar Bombing -- 










-- Attempt on Abliz Damolla, parliamentary member, 
head of great mosque. 
1994-07-18 
(days) 





Possibly up to 100,000 protestors at climax. 





“The end of Communist rule,” and “Long live 
Uyghurstan.” Note: Not mentioned in any 
mainland Chinese sources. [Although scholars 
such as Linda Benson and Ingvar Svanberg, and 
Michael Dillion report this event as established 
fact (Benson and Svanber 1998: 194–195; Dillon 
2004, no. 949:68-69), James Millward expresses 
skepticism, since it was reported only in a Hong 
Kong magazine that regularly retails stories 
unflattering to the CCP. Millward raises three 
important objections: first, if as large as reported, it 
would have been one of the most serious 
antigovernment protests since 1949; second, news 
of a protest of the size proposed would almost 
certainly have traversed the border into 
Kazakhstan; and third, having reported the violent 
uprisings in Baren in 1990 and Ghulja in 1997, 
CCPofficials would have had no obvious reason 
not to publicize this event as well (Millward 2007, 
no. 1640: 329).] 
1995-07-07 
(1 day) 
Khotan Riot 1,000 




Ghulja Demonstration -- 
A protest at the jailing of Abdulhelil, leader of 



















Sayar Township Robbery 4 
15,000 yuan stolen from vice chairman of the 
People’s Political Consultative Congress, 
Rehmetulla Hidayet, by 4 masked men. 
1996-03-22 
(1 day) 
Toqsu (Xinhe) Assassination 2 
Hakim Sidiq Haji, vice chairman of the Islamic 
committee, mosque head. 
1996-03-27 
(1 day) 











East Turkestan Liberation Organization (ETLO) 




Quca Bombing spree 10 After April 27, 1996, boarder agreement by 










Attempt on cleric and parliamentary delegate 




Sayar Bombing -- 
Chinese Foreign Ministry attributes the bombing to 




Prison break by 
“separatists” 12 
Splittists broke out of the Tarim Prison, stole 
weapons, and killed police, army, and civiilans; 




Qaghiliq Assault 6 6 base-level cadres and masses injured; 4–5 killed. 
1996-10-23 
(1 day) 
Yerkand Murder -- 
Splittists murdered an “innocent Han and two 
helpers”; there was supposedly a later plot to kill 




(several places) Murder 9 3 farmers murdered at home. 
1997-02-05 
(2 day) 
Ghulja Riot 5,000 Biggest incident since Baren. 
1997-02-23 
(1 day) 
Aqsu Assassination -- Killed Omarjan, head of bingtuan. 
1997-02-25 
(1 day) 
Urumci Bombing -- PRC consulate website claims it was the work of 
“ET National Solidarity Union.” 
1997-03-23 
(1 day) 
Aqsu Assassination -- 
Mamatjan Sadiq, party committee secretary of a 
minzu farm, Bingtuan no. 1 division; Ziley 
Abdurazaq, a woman encouraging other women to 
take off their veils and use family planning; 


















Qasim Masir, the chairman of a township village 







Assassination 3 Mamat Seyit, party branch secretary, was killed by 




Baslik, Awat Assassination -- 












Multiple rebellions in widely spaced towns with 
3,200 involved. 800 staged an armed attack on 
Hejing and Khoshut party and government 








Aziz Abbas, imam of the Yangi Mahata Mosque, 
helped break a 500,000-yuan robbery and capture 
the head of the bombing on February 5, 1997; 





--  Killed Yonus Sidiq Damolla, Islamic association, 
head of Bay mosque: blamed on separatists. 
1998-01-27 
(1 day) 
Qaghiliq Assassination -- 




Ghulja Disturbance -- 1,000 police dispatched. 
1998-02-22 
(37 day) 
Qaghiliq Bombings -- 
6 bombing s total through March 1998; economic 
damages of 100 million yuan. 
1998-04-07 
(1 day) 






PSB official Long Fei was killed. PSB blamed it 
on Mamtimin Hazrat and the ETLO. Not originally 
attributed to terrorists in 1998. 
1998-05-21 
(--) 
Aqsu Battle -- 
PSB officials encircled “violent terrorists” in their 
Black Hills hideout; the suspects kept up a barrage 
of hand grenades until all were killed or blown up. 
1998-05-23 
(3 day) 
Urumci Arson (40) -- 15 successful; no injuries. 
1998-05-28 
(--) 
Ili District Gunfight -- 




Khotan District Battle -- 
2 “violent terrorists” pursued by PSB fought them 
with knives, injured police, and took hostages. 
Outcomes not specified. 
1998-06-26 
(--) 
Ili District Gunfight -- 








Ablat Tayip, chairman of the Ustun Aral village 
committee, was killed while helping police break 














Tas Razaq, secretary of Politics and Law 
Committee, stabbed while apprehending head of 
“violent terrorist gang.” 
1999-02-10 
(1 day) 
Urumci Gunfight -- 
Murat Rustam was killed while trying to 
apprehend suspects in a major robbery-murder 





with police 300 
Police tried to arrest 30 Uyghur men shouting 
“independence for XJ” after a night of drinking. 
Crowd growing to 300 surrounded police, who 
clashed with 150. 
1999-03-17 
(1 day) 
Changji city Bombing -- 
PAP headquarters admitted that 30 officers had 
died in a motorcade bound for Shihezi; military 
insiders say it was “definitely” a bomb set by 
separatists. There also were gunfights with 






Reported separatists attacked a power station on a 
military base in Hejing, blowing up, killing or 
wounding 12; 12 armed separatists were killed in 
police pursuit afterward. 
1999-07-17 
-- 
Khotan Armed attack 2,000 
2,000 protestors surround and attack the PSB after 




Khotan Armed attack 300 
300 people mob the PSB as security personnel try 
to apprehend Hebibolla, suspected in the Hotan 








Riot at the execution of Murtaza; Chinese sources 









The molla of the mosque (and apparently some 








Khudahardi Tokhti, head of a patrol station; 
blamed on separatists. 
1999-08-24 
(1 day) 
Khotan area Assault -- 




Khotan area Assault -- 
Head of the Nurbagh police substation was 




Khotan area Killing 21 Police shot and killed Kuras, called a “terrorist 








A government driver, Tursun Qadir, and a 
township communications specialist, Qadir 




Poskam Assault -- 
Attack on Sayri Township PSB; describe in 







Turghun Aqniyaz, a policeman, was killed by 
“violent terrorists” on his way home. 
1999-12-15 
(1) 
Khotan County Arrest battle 4 
In trying to arrest suspected separatists, the PAP 
officer Abduqeyum Jumeniyaz was killed 
2000-09-28 
-- 
Almaty Murder -- Chinese Foreign Ministry claims 2 Qazaq police 
were murdered by members of the ULO. 
2001-02-03 
(1 day) 
Shufu, Kashgar Assassination -- Mamatjan Yaquip, cadre. 
2001-08-07 
(1 day) 
Urumci Riot 200 
Started when inspectors challenged an unlicensed 
fruit vendor; people threw fruit, rocks, bricks at 
inspector; people surrounded substation after 
police collared a suspected ringleader, police 








Police surprised a house full of suspected 
separatists; 4 died in the gun battle, including the 
chief, Chen Ping; a cache of weapons was 
reportedly found; report of a plan to storm a 







ETLO reportly imported weapons into Tibet. 
Reports identified two Uyghurs, Ablet Tursun and 




Qaraqas Protest 180 
Some 180 people protested the destruction of a 
mosque deemed too close to a school, thus a 
“negative influence” on students. A Chinese 
official said it was the third such mosque 
destruction that year. 
2001-11-02 
(1) 
Atus City, Ustun 
Atus Township 
Gunfight -- 
Feng Tao, the head of special antiseparatist PSB 




Khotan Protest 100 
A day-long protest by 100+ workers after 200+ 
were laid off at a textile factory that originally had 
1,300 workers, of which 80% had been Uyghur. 
Workers were worried they’d get no severance; 
local government officials assured them they 
would. 
2002-05 Khotan Stabbing 2 A teacher, an advocate of an Islamic state, was 
 64 
(1 day) 
dismissed during a patriotic education campaign; 






Yasin Mamut, party committee vice secretary and 
head of a police substation, was killed while 
inspecting stand selling religious texts; Yusupqadir 
Idris, PAP vice head, was killed “protecting a 
cadre” in a struggle with “violent terrorists.” 
2003-03-07 
(1 day) 
Khorgos Student protest 100 
A whole class (minzu unspecified) boycotted and 
staged a sit-in in over “exam immigrants”; said to 
have “threatened social order.” 
2003-03-18 
(1 day) 
Manas Student protest 300 
Some 300 students boycotted classes at the peak, 








Sa’atquiz Tokhti, an assistant in the family-
planning office, was killed by the husband of a 





PAP barracks -- 
Wang Lexiang, deputy PSB chief, deputy PSB 
chief, announced the “successful” 2004 bombings 
in August 2006, after claiming the PSB had foiled 
other bombing attacks (suspicious report by 
Xinjiang government given attempt to prove there 






A day-long protest by farmers, foresters, and 
herdsmen. A hydropower station under 
construction would require the relocation of 18,000 
people; 38,000 yuan compensation offered, only 





rail line -- See entry for March 2, 2004, event. 
2005-03-12 
(1) 
Poskam Fight 22 
17 to 18 Uyghur students fought with Hans; all 
were arrested, and 4 were sentenced; 4 teachers 
were also arrested. 
2005-04-16 
(3 days) 
Korla Strike 100 
Korla taxi drivers stuck over a newly announced 
tax of 4,000 yuan per year; on day 3, scabs were 
driving with covered license plates; the number of 
participants is an estimates. 
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